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ABSTRACT 
The Pacific region is no longer the peaceful and secure region most people thought it was. Peace and security 
crises are recent, the) are likel) to reignite and. there are potential crisis situations brewing around the region. The 
region howe,er is not another frica or South America. Added to this is the Pacific Islands Forum's peace and 
securit) framework ,,hich has no legal statu and has gaps in its armour. Moreover, peace and security crises have 
severe results on small Pacific communities. particularly due to their brutality, potential to collapse governments 
and the comple. it) of the causes of conflicts. Current political climate within the Forum supports regionalism, and 
there is an emerging nited ation's willingness to share its universal responsibility to address international peace 
and securit) with regional organisations. It could therefore be an opportune time for the Forum States to consider 
formalising the Forum· peace and securit) framework. The objective of such formalisation is to have an 
organisation to dri,·e regional responses to traditional security threats, early and effectively, and most importantly 
with legal it) and legitimaC). The formalised Forum could be based on the concept that States' sovereignty now 
invohes a respon ibilit) to protect its own citizens, and also citizens of others, from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanit). l\loreover. the Forum could be a guardian for international humanitarian 
law and human right law during non-international armed conflict in the Pacific. Furthermore, the Forum would 
have the power to resort to the use of force but as a ver) last resort, and more important!), as a deterrent for 
instigators of unwanted wide scale conflict. This may hopeful!) assist Forum Leaders in achieving their vision ofa 
region of "peace, harmon). ecurit) and economic prosperit). o that all its people can lead free and worthwhile 
lives". 
WORD COUNT: The text of this paper (excluding title page, abstract, table of contents, footnotes and 
bibliography) comprises approximate!) 14.982 words. 
International Law-Peace and Security-Regionalism 
I INTRODUCTION 
The Pacific region i no longer the peaceful and secure region most people thought it 
was. Non-traditional securit~ threats, such a climate change, rising sea levels, unlawful fishing, 
trans-national crime. globalisation pressure and infectious diseases are the main threats 
occupying the attention of Pacific States. 1 HO\\e er it is the traditional security threats, such as 
armed conflict and coup d'etats. \\hich warrants more consistent regional attention. Although 
peace and securit~ crises in the form of armed conflict are unfortunately not new to the Pacific 
region there are. ho\,ever. some concerning features.2 First, peace and security crises are more 
recent. \\ith Bougain ille from 1989-1998. Solomon Islands from 1998-2003 and Fiji in 2000. 
Secondly, although these recent conflicts have subsided, they have potential to break out again. 
Thirdly. there are potential crises in the political tensions in Tonga, the inter-tribal fighting in 
the Highlands Pro ince of Papua Ne\\ Guinea and. the political instability in Vanuatu. 
Peace and securit} crises in the Pacific however do not equate to doom and gloom at the 
level of other regions.3 evertheless once they occur they do ha e profound effects on Pacific 
countries with their ast area, small economies of scale and very limited resources. On a 
regional le el they threaten the region ·s reputation and international clout, thus detrimentally 
affecting foreign in estment opportunities, tourism and participation in international 
organisations.4 The Pacific States have thus recognised that a peaceful and secure region 1s a 
cornerstone of guaranteeing economic and social de elopment.5 
The Pacific Islands Forum. the pre-eminent regional organisation in the Pacific region, 
has attempted to establish a framework for a regional response to peace and security crises. The 
author suggests it can be strengthened. One option a ailable is to formalise the Pacific Islands 
1 John Henderson --Toe Impact of the International Setting on Regiona l Security in the Pacific" (Forum Regional 
Security Committee, Auckland, 15 June 2005) 2. 
" 1980: Santo Rebellion in \'anuatu; 1987: self-determination movements by the indigenous Kanak people in ew 
Caledonia; 1987: two successive military coup in Fiji. 
3 Contrast Ben Reilly "'The Afi-icanisation of the South Pacific" (2000) 54(3) Australian Journal of International 
Affairs 261. 
4 Michael Po\.\les .. taking\ aves in the Big Lagoon: The Influence of Pacific Island Forum Countries in the 
United . ations·· [2002] La Revue Juridique Pol)'nesienne 59, 73-7..J.. 
5 Twent)-Third outh Pacific Forum Communique, (Honiara, Solomon Islands, 8-9 July 1992), Annex, para 2. 
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Forum' peace and securit framework, giving the Forum a legal mandate to respond to crises, 
in a more timel: and effecti e way.\\ ith legality and legitimacy. 
In Part II of this paper the three recent peace and security crises will be analysed to 
illustrate ho\\ the} pro,oke international law concerns, and also briefly discuss some situations 
that potential!) can become a peace and securit crisis. The Pacific Islands Forum and its 
regional peace and security frame\,ork \ ill then be briefly outlined and analysed. The question 
ofwh~ formalisation of the Forum's peace and security crisis is an option for effective regional 
response to peace and security crisis will then be presented. In Part III the relevant international 
law issue the Forum could face relating to peace and security will be identified and analysed. 
In Part IV formalisation of the Forum's peace and security framework will be discussed by 
suggesting the Forum's legal mandate, and the minimum peace and security purposes, 
principles and powers. including suggestions for the administrative set-up and establishing a 
Forum Response Force. 
It is not the intention of the author to argue that this is the only , ay forward. The 
objecti e is to timulate discussion that a more stronger and effective mechanism is needed to 
deal, ith the threats to the Pacific's peace and security situation. It is not the scope of this paper 
to deal with security in its broad context. The paper will rather focus on responding to 
traditional peace and security crises, ithin the region. 
II PEACE A D SECURITY l THE PACIFIC 
A Recent Peace and Security Crises 
1 Papua Ne11· Guinea: Bougainville Seces ion 
In Ma) 1989, armed conflict based on secession objectives broke out in the Papua New 
Guinea (P G) island of Bougain ille bet\,een the Papua New Guinea Defence Forces 
(PNGDF) and a group known as the Bougain ille Revolutionary Army (BRA). The BRA was a 
pro-independent group that was created by disgruntled Bougainvillean landowners who were 
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refused a greater share of earnings from a copper mine located in the centre of the island that 
accounted for 40% of PNG's export and around 20% of the PNG government's revenue.6 The 
landO\rners also were refused compensation for loss of land and environmental pollution caused 
by the mine·s operations. These grievances originated from pre-decolonisation days when 
Bougain ille. \\ho is ethnically and geographical!) separate from P G, sought separation from 
PNG \\ ith the UN. The armed conflict v,as complicated when Bougainvilleans opposed to the 
pro-independence mo ement formed the Bougainville Resistance Force (BRF). 
The armed conflict lasted for a decade. During the conflict ''human rights violations, 
including extrajudicial executions. ''di appearances'·, ill treatment and arbitrary arrests and 
detention'· occurred at an --alarming rate·'.7 In I 997 the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary and arbitrary executions reported that human rights violations were committed by all 
sides of the conOict. This included a na al blockade denying essential goods and medicine, 
burning of villages. destruction of plantations. torture. lootings. kidnapping, rape and murder.
9 
During his isit. the Special Rapporteur received reports that between 1991 and 1995, at least 
64 persons were belie ed to have been extra-judicially executed by the P GDF. 1° Foreign 
States v,ere also reported to ha e pro ided weapons to each side. 11 The regional community, 
however. ignored the conflict because it was considered a domestic matter. Repeated attempts 
to negotiate a formal ceasefire failed. 
In 1997 the P G Go ernment was feeling the heat of the conflict and decided to engage 
overseas mercenaries to crush the BRA. This led to \\idespread political opposition and a 
change of polic) for negotiation with the BRA to end the conflict. The New Zealand 
government was thus approached to facilitate the peace talks. In January 1998 a "permanent 
and irre ocable ceasefire'· was agreed at Lincoln niversity. In 200 I a comprehensive peace 
6 nited ation Obsen er lission in Bougaim ille (U 0\18) <http: www.un.org> (last accessed 23 May 2005) 
7 Amnesty International "Papua ew Guinea: Bougaim ille: the Forgotten Human Rights Tragedy" 26 February 
1997 <http: web.amnest) .org> (last accessed 2 October 2005). 
8 Report b) the Special Rapporteur on his mission to Papua e\, Guinea island of Bougainville from 23 to 28 
October 1995, L document E, C .4.199614 Add.2, para 33. [ Special Rapporteur Report] 
9 U Special Rapporteur Report, above n 8, para 28-33. 
IOU Special Rapporteur Report, above n 8, para 50. 
11 U Special Rapporteur Report, above n 8. para 34. Australian helicopters were used by the P G Government. 
and weapons and support were received b) the BRA from supporters in the Solomon Islands. 
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agreement known as the Bougainville Peace Agreement was signed. The Agreement provided 
for: the political autonom) of Bougain ille with its own elected government and legislature; the 
option to hold a referendum for independence from PNG within 15 years; and, the disposal of 
all weapons held b) militias. The United ations (UN) \\as requested to monitor the 
implementation of the Agreement. In June 2005 Bougainville held its first formal elections 
under the Agreement, and elected a former rebel leader Joseph Kabui as its first President. The 
UN mission was ended in the same month. and ,vas hailed by the UN as a model for peace 
building. 12 
!though the conflict has been resol ed and a clear path has been set for Bougainville. 
there are still igns toda that some Bougainvilleans still prefer to use military means to obtain 
complete independence from PNG. This was illustrated in the recent repott that former Fijian 
soldiers are in Bougainville providing military training. 13 Moreover, some Bougainvilleans 
remain suspicious of the sudden death of Francis Ona, the long time rebel who did not 
recognise the peace agreement. Ona died a couple of weeks after the Bougainville elections. 
Another concern for PNG. apart from Bougainville. is its high level of lawlessness and, 
the apparent violence of police officers against children. 14 There is also concern about the 
growing deterioration of political institutions and dysfunctional politics in Papua New Guinea. 15 
In 2004. Australia and P G launched the Enhanced Cooperation Programme (ECP) to 
strengthen Im and order. border and transport security. and the public sector. 16 Australia 
provided the Programme as a response to "gro,\ ing instability'' in PNG. and it was deemed 
essential for Australia's fight against tetTOrism. The ECP involved the deployment of more than 
200 Australian Federal Police to work with the PNG Police. The Programme however was 
thwarted when the PNG Supreme Court ruled that the agreement providing immunity for 
1
" ABC Radio Australia "U hails Bougain-ville peace model" 7 Jui) 2005 <http://www.abc.net.au> (last accessed 
8 July '.!005) 
11 ABC Radio ustralia ··Controversy escalates O\er Fijian soldiers in PNG" 25 ovember 2005 
<http: ww, .abc.net.au> (last accessed 28 0\ ember 2005) 
14 Human Rights Watch ,\,faking Their Own Rules: Police Beatings. Rape. Torture qf Children in Papua New 
Guinea [2005] I 7(8)(C) I luman Rights\ atch 24 <http: wwv-. .hrw.org> (last accessed 4 October 2005) 
15 Hugh ~ hite and Elsina Wainwright Strengthening Our eighbo11r: Australia and the future qf Papua New 
Guinea (Australian Strategic Polic Institute, Canberra, 2004) 29-30. 
16 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Government of Australia, "Papua New Guinea Enhanced 
Cooperation Program (ECP) July 200-t <http://www.dfat.gov .au> (last accessed 4 October 2005) 
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Australian officers was unconstitutional. 17 Australia subsequently withdrew its police officers. 
At the time of \\Titing negotiations are underway to rekindle the project. PNG is also receiving 
more securit) related attention from the region folio\\ ing the triple bombings in Bali in October 
2005. 18 
2 Solomon Islands: State of Lawlessness 
In 1998 various groups of the indigenous people of the island of Guadalcanal in the 
Solomon Islands began a targeted campaign to displace from Guadalcanal settlers from the 
neighbouring island of Malaita. The Guali uprising initially consisted of various groups of 
militants who e\entuall~ united under the banner of the lsatabu Freedom Movement (!FM). 
Thousands of Malaitan settlers were assaulted. their property confiscated and, were forced from 
their homes and plantations. Inter-marriage families were forcefully split. The Malaitans 
flocked to the capital Honiara and either set up refuge or boarded crowded ships to return to 
Malaita. In 1999 the Malaitans responded by establishing organised militia which became 
known as the Malaita Eagle Forces (MEF). The MEF was also supported by the Royal Solomon 
Islands Police Service. which 75% of its officers were Malaitans. 19 The MEF began counter 
strikes against the IFM, and eventually took control of the capital Honiara, while the IFM 
controlled rural Guadalcanal. 
The conflict was brutal. It was riddled with "abductions, torture, rape and killings, 
forced displacement, looting and burning dO\ n of homes''. 20 A total of 24,597 people were 
displaced from rural Guadalcanal, and 10,712 people were displaced from the capital Honiara, 
making a total of 35,309 displaced civilians from the 60,275 Guadalcanal population. 21 
Businesses and homes \\ere permanently destroyed both in urban and rura l areas. The militants 
17 Special Reference by the Morobe Provincial £-recutire [2005] PGSC I <http://www.paclii.org> (last accessed 4 
October 2005). 
18 ABC Radio ustralia '"Indonesia bombings highlight security concerns for P G, Fiji" 3 October 2005; "Former 
P G defence chief ays raises security concerns·· 3 October 2005 <http: /www.abc.net.au> (last accessed 4 
October 2005). 
19 Amnesty International '·Solomon Islands: forgotten conflict"' August 2004, 7 <http://www.amnesty.org> (last 
accessed 2 October 2005). [AJ Solomon Islands Report] 
oo 
- Al Solomon I land Report, above n 19, I. 
21 Jon Fraenkel The Manipulation of Custom: From Uprising to Intervention in the Solomon Islands (Victoria 
University Press,\ ellington, 200-1-), 21, 56. [Fraenkel] 
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did not on!) target each other, but people from other provinces were subjected to "thefts, 
harassment and e tortion". 22 Militant \\ho were seriously injured and were recovering in 
medical centres \\ere attacked and killed by enemy militants, followed by the deprivation of 
medical supplies.23 There were also reports of random shooting into public meetings. 24 The 
IFM and MEF also frequently tortured their captives or hostages. 25 With the collapse of the 
main law enforcement agenc), the security of civilians in the Solomon Islands was at the whim 
of the ethnically di ided militants. 
In June 1999 the Commonwealth Envoy, Sitiveni Rabuka, the former Fijian Prime 
Minister and 1987 militar. coup leader, succe sfully negotiated the Honiara Peace Accord . 
Howe er it was not full_ observed by the militants and fighting continued.26 The government at 
the time led by Bartholomew ·LJlufa'alu requested the Australian government to provide armed 
police support. Australia refused this request on the basis of their arms length policy regarding 
the Pacific.27 
In June 2000 the MEF overthre\\ the already weakened 'Ulufa'alu government because 
of its failures. and the desire to ha e a go ernment to meet militant demands. Once the 
Mannaseh Soga are-led go ernment was appointed it managed to establish a 90-day ceasefire. 
Negotiations for peace then proceeded despite continuing sporadic incidents of violence. 
According to Fraenkel the militants opted for negotiations due to "the offer of peace 
dividends'', "conflict weariness'' and the realisation of the "futility of full scale civil war''. 28 The 
negotiations culminated in the Towns ille Peace Agreement in October 2000 which crystallised 
the government's policy of providing ·justice before peace''. The government however made 
great strides in paying out '·peace di idends·' to all sides of the conflict, enacting legally 
22 Fraenkel. abo,e n 2 l_ 87-89. In respon e to 1EF violence towards Western Province people, Malaitans were 
subject to violence in Western Province, and some islands made secessionist declarations. 
23 Al Solomon Islands Report. above n 19. 14-16. 
24 Al Solomon Islands Report. abo,e n l 9. 17. 
25 Al Solomon Island Report, abo,e n 19, 18-2'.?.. 
26 Fraenkel, abo, en 21. 71-72. 
27 
Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka "Australian foreign polic a.ttd the RAMS! intervention in Solomon Islands" [2005] 
17(2) The Contemporaf) Pacific 283, 286. [Kabutaulaka 1) 
28 Fraenkel, abO\·e n 2 I, I 05. 
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dubious blanket amnest_ legislation and re-establishing a military police to restore national 
security and reign in the fighting militant factions. 
The Agreement howe er was flawed in not ensuring complete disarmament of militants 
and, its non-inclusion of some militant factions and fighting in other parts of the State. The 
government's new policy e entually split the IFM and the MEF into smaller factions that 
fought each other both in Guadalcanal and Malaita. This multi-party confiict accelerated 
lawlessness. especially in rural Guadalcanal and Malaita, to the point where resolution was 
beyond domestic resources. In 200 I the Solomon Islands government again requested 
assistance to ustralia and New Zealand. Both countries however offered advice and financial 
support but did not deploy much needed police and military personnel.29 
In December 2001 the scheduled four- early elections took place despite initial 
hesitation b the government. The results returned a new government under Sir Allan 
Kemakeza, a former cabinet minister who was dismissed on corruption charges. Despite 
attempts to re italise the previous ceasefire, the new government had lost control of the 
economy, security forces and te1Titory , and thus had little hope of resolving the conflict.30 The 
government was therefore forced to look for international assistance. for a third time. 
On 5 June 2003 Kemakeza met the Australian Prime Minister and negotiations 
commenced on deploying an Australian-led foreign intervention. Australia however insisted 
that the Pacific Islands Forum mechanisms should be utilised. After endorsement was given by 
the 16 State members of the Pacific Islands Forum under its Biketawa Declaration. the Solomon 
Islands Governor General formall. requested assistance followed b) unanimous endorsement 
by the Solomon Islands parliament. A Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was then signed by 
the Solomon Islands go ernment with the governments of Australia, Fiji, Samoa, Tonga. New 
2qTarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka '' "Failed State" and the War on Terror: fntervention in Solomon Islands" [2004) 72 
Asia Pacific Issues I, 3. [Kabutaulaka II] 
JO Fraenkel, above n 21, 164. 
11 
Zealand and Papua e\\ Guinea giving rise to the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon 
Islands (RAMSl).31 Article 2 of the SOFA provides that:32 
The ssisting States ma) deploy a Visiting Contingent of police forces, armed forces and other 
personnel to Solomon Islands to assist in the provision of security and safety to persons and 
property: maintain supplies and services essential to the life of the Solomon Islands community; 
prevent and suppress violence, intimidation and crime; support and develop Solomon Islands 
in titutions; and generall) to assist in the maintenance of law and order in Solomon Islands. 
In July 2003 the first deployment of troops. police and civilian officials arrived in the 
Solomon Islands. The arrival of RAMS! \\>as ··significant and positive'', as ''law and order" was 
re-established. and the Government's finances began to "stabilize". 33 RAMSI's arrival 
effecti ely ended the lawlessness in the Solomon Islands with faction leaders surrendering 
themsel es and their ,,eapons almost immediate!). By November 2003 more than 3,700 
weapons (including 660 high-powered military weapons) were surrendered to RAMS!, and 
between 24 July and December 2003. 733 people were arrested on I, 168 charges, including a 
serving Minister.34 The rule of law was prioritised and institutional reform initiated along with 
economic revival. 
The success of the initial stages however. seems to be thawing. This seems to arise from 
the new challenge RAMS! is facing during the final nation building stages. Investigating high-
level corruption is sensitive.35Shifting political alignments threatens RAMSI's state invitation. 
A legal challenge has been filed against the status of RAMS! in the Solomon Islands courts.36 
There are doubts about the constitutionality of the facilitating legislation. 37 Ethnic tension and 
31 Agreement between Solomon Islands, Australia, ew Zealand, Fiji, Papua new Guinea, Samoa and Tonga 
Concerning the Operations and tatus of the Police and rmed Forces and other Personnel Deployed to Solomon 
Islands to ssist in the Restoration of Law and Order and Security, May 2003 <http://www.dfat.gov.au> (last 
accessed 2 October 2005). [R 1SI SOFA] 
n RA fSI SOF , above n 31. art 2. 
33 Hon Laurie Chan. 1\linister of Foreign Affairs, Solomon Islands "Statement to the 58 th Session of the United 
Nations General ssembl) ··, I October 2003 <http: www.un.org> (last accessed 23 May 2005). 
'
4 Kabulaulaka II. abo\e n 29. 5. 
35 Elsina \ ainwrighl "HO\\ is RAMS! faring? Progress, challenges and lessons teamed'' Strategic Insights, 
(Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra. 2005) 5-8. [Wainwright) 
36 Wainwright, above n 35, 6. 
37 Joseph D. Foukona "Regional Intervention in Solomon Islands" (2005) 9( I) Journal of South Paci fie Law 
<http:/ www.paclii.org > (last accessed 12 October 2005). 
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securit_ concerns still exist 'S One constructi e criticism of RAMS! is that it has focussed too 
much on state building and not on the role of civil societies in Solomon Islands plural society.39 
This criticism seems to reflect that leading up to RAMS! there was a lack of detailed 
preparation and appreciation of these impo1tant issues. There is also a fear that there may be 
increasing dependenc) on RAMSI because the Solomon Islands as a people are not engaged 
fully in nation-building.4° Final! , the escalating financial costs and constant personnel juggling 
for go ernments that support RAMSI may change political will and commitments. 
3 Fiji: Third Coup 
On 19 May 2000 a group of armed men led by a Fijian businessman named George 
Speight (a.k.a. llikina Naitini) forcefully took over the Fijian parliament. The newly elected 
Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry and around 36 people, including members of his Cabinet 
and the People's Coalition, were taken hostage. Chaudhry and his son were assaulted by 
Speight's men. and some hostages were temporarily denied food and medication. Speight 
declared the 1997 Constitution abrogated and appointed a new government to ensure supremacy 
for the indigenous Fijians. Supporters of the coup and opportunists rioted, looted and burned 
down hundreds of businesses and homes ov. ned by the lndo-Fijian population. The violence 
also reached towns and illages where lndo-Fijian farmers were robbed of their crops, cattle 
and valuables. 
On 29 Ma the President, the late Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, "stepped aside" as Head of 
State of Fiji after being advised b the then Fijian Police Commissioner that the police force 
could not guarantee the nation·s safety and, that the military wanted to abrogate the 1997 
Constitution because it lacked the provisions to resolve the situation. The President did not 
agree but could not do anything but move aside together with the Constitution. The head of the 
military, Commodore Frank Bainimarama, then issued emergency decrees purporting to 
abrogate the Constitution. and ½'hich effecti el) established a military government under 
38 Hon Kaliopate Tavola, (Minister for Foreign Affairs and External Trade (Fiji)), Maiava lulai Toma and Greg 
Urwin Mission Helpem Fren A Review of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (Forum Secretariat, 
Suva, 2005) para 12. [Forum RAMS! Re iew] 
39 Kabutaulaka I, above n '27, 283. 
4° Kabutaulaka I, above n 27, 299. 
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martial law. The military government negotiated \\ ith Speight for the release of the hostages 
while law and order deteriorated around the country. In July an agreement that purported to 
grant conditional amnest) for Speight and his supporters was reached. On 14 July, after 56 days 
of forced entrapment, the hostages were relea ed. A new Interim Civilian Government was then 
appointed,, ith a new President and ne\\ Prime Minister. 
After the hostages were released the rebels failed to meet the conditions of their being 
granted amnesty. and were eventually arrested and charged with treason. Supporters of the coup 
instigated further \ iolence but were effectively subdued by the authorities. In November some 
soldiers temporarily took o er the Queen Elisabeth Barracks and aimed to remove Bainimarama 
and free the coup leaders held in custody. Three soldiers were taken hostage and killed. A 
military counter attack successfully returned the barracks to military hands. The soldiers 
involved in the mutiny were arrested and handed over to military custody. Five of those soldiers 
involved in the mutiny were beaten to death by some military troops. 
In Februa1") 2001 the Fijian Court of Appeal declared that the 1997 Constitution was not 
lawfully abrogated during the 2000 coup. and was sti 11 the supreme law of the land. and that the 
Interim Ci ilian Government's existence ,,as thus unlawful. 41 After initial opposition to the 
Court of Appeal decision the Interim Government agreed to hold elections in August 200 I. 
Members of the Interim Civilian Government were subsequently formally elected as the 
government, howe er there were political disputes concerning the makeup of the Cabinet that 
was resol ed by the Supreme Court.42 
Today Fiji is still recovering from the aftermath of the 2000 coup. The men who carried 
out the coups, along v ith the identified supporters have been prosecuted and sentenced, 
howe er some remain at large.43 The soldiers "'ho carried out the mutiny have also been dealt 
with in the courts.44 The reco er_ process has however been stained by the Government's 
4 1 Republic of Fiji Islands v Prasad [2001] FJC'A 2 <http: /\\ww.paclii.org> (last accessed 3 October 2005). 
4
~ In re the President ·s reference, Qarase v Chaudh1:1· - Decision of the Court [2004] FJSC I 
<http://www.paclii.org> (last accessed 4 October 2005). 
43 Senilo/i v State [2004] FJCA 46 <http://www.paclii.org> (last accessed 3 Oclober 2005). 
44 Pacific Islands Report" ine Fiji mutineers get early prison release" 21 June 2005 
<http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org> (last accessed 23 June 2005). 
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introduction of the ··Promotion of Reconciliation. Tolerance and Unity Bill'" before the Fijian 
Parliament.45 The Bill establishes a Commission\\ ith the power to grant amnesty to those who 
committed political I) moti ated acts during the 2000 coup.46 This has divided the population. 
Sir Geoffrey Palmer. the former Prime Minister of New Zealand and constitutional academic 
and lawyer was reported to view the Bill as a '"recipe for disaster". 47 More troubling is the 
militat-y's opposition to the Bill and its statement that they have ·'no qualms in removing a 
government that will bring back chaos''.48 The Australian government has also expressed its 
concern about the Bill directly to the Fijian government, and the Fijian government is reported 
to have agreed to make amendrnents.49 The Bill has been read twice in the Fijian Parliament 
and is now before the Select Committee and is expected to be re-submitted to the Fijian 
Parliament towards the end of 2005. 
It is safe to sa that the ethnic division in Fiji 1s still rife, and social and political 
reconciliation is still beyond the horizons. The aim to bring to justice all persons directly 
responsible for the 2000 coup remains unachie ed, and it is troubling that those suspected held, 
or are still holding high political office and social ranks. The continued favouring of the 
indigenous population and marginalisation of non-Fijians are embers that may ignite further 
racial iolence. All Fijians, and the region, will again brace themselves for any fu11her unrest 
after the upcoming elections in early 2006. 
45 Fiji Times Online "MPs walk out of House"" 3 June 2005 <http://www.fijitimes.com> (last accessed 3 June 
2005) Fiji Times Online "Opposition to the Unity Bill tells its own story" 3 June 2005 <http://www.fijitimes.com> 
(last accessed 3 June 2005). 
46 Promotion of Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill 2005, s 5( I )(e) <http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org> (last 
accessed 22 May 2005). 
47 Fiji Times Online ·'Recipe for disaster"' 23 June 2005 <http: //www.fijitimes.com> (last accessed 23 June 2005). 
48 Fiji Times Online ·'Arm) watches Bill's progress" I June 2005 <http://www.fijitimes.com> (last accessed I June 
2005); Fiji Times Online "Officers have a right to be there" 3 June 2005 <http: //www.fijitimes.com> (last accessed 
3 June 2005): Radio ew Zealand International "Fiji militar) commander calls on state institutions to uphold the 
rule oflav/' 8 July 2005 <http: /www.mzi.com> (last accessed 9 Jui) 2005); Radio ew Zealand International 
'"Fiji military commander says Reconciliation Bill is the work of warped minds"' 11 July 2005 
<http: //w\.\'w.mzi.com> (last accessed 12 July 2005); Pacific Islands Report "Qarasc says Fiji 'Unity' Bill will be 
reviewed" 13 July 2005" <http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org> (last accessed 15 July 2005). 
49 ABC Radio ustralia 'Fiji reportedly agrees to amend coup amnesty bill" 30 September 2005 
<http:/ vvww.abc.net.au (last accessed -I- October 2005). 
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-I Potential Peace and Security Crises 
t the time of writing Tonga is on the verge of political transition. Following a six week 
industrial action. the fir t ever in Tonga, by aggrie ed civil servants relating to recent 
government salar) restructuring. political reformists v,anting to end the Tongan King's control 
of the Executi e Go ernment ha e demanded that political reform be implemented by 5 
December 2005. During the strike there were sporadic acts of violence that included ransacking 
of go ernment schools50• burning of government vehicles and a royal home, and also protests 
and skirmishes outside the King's royal residence in Auckland 51 • Most government services 
were suspended, and a few operated on skeleton staff. Tonga thus presented a picture that it was 
starting to collapse. ·2 Instability is therefore likely to be sourced from "inequalities of wealth, 
the pre alence of injustice, and the weakness of political accountability". 53 Proposals for 
political reform are now a constant topic of discussion, and the momentum is escalating. 54 lt 
remains to be seen ho-w this transition will take place in the next fe\.\ days, and more 
importantly, in the next generation. 
Other potential crises are developing in the Highlands Province of Papua ew Guinea 
where in 2004 inter-tribal fighting. allegedly driven and armed by politicians, has moved from 
bows and arrows to high powered assault weapons, increasing the death rate "exponentially".55 
Jn Vanuatu. political manoeuvrings resulted in further political instability during 2004. This 
50 Matangi Tonga Online,'· tudents smash Tonga College as Govt removes striking principal and head tutor" 17 
August 2005 <ww\\.matangitonga.to> {last accessed 27 August 2005). 
51 Angela Gregor) "Protests turns ugly at ro)al residence" (22 ugust 2005) The New Zealand Herald, Auckland, 
A3, ick enter "ft" no picnic for Tonga strikers·' (23 August 2005) The Dominion, Wellington, A6. 
5
~ Nick Venter "King's old house bums to ground" (24 ugust 2005) The Dominion, Wellington, A3; "Royal plea 
at strike demo" (26 ugust 2005) The Dominion, Wellington, 3; "The Crumbling Kingdom" (27 August 2005) 
The Dominion, Wellington, El. 
53 l.C. Campbell 'Tongan De,elopment and Pacific Island ecurity Issues" in Jim Rolfe (ed) The Asia-Pac{fic: A 
Region in Transition ( ia-Pacific Center for Securil) Studies. Ilonolulu, 2004), 335, 337. 
54 Matangi Tonga Online ··pop calls for elected Prime Minister" 11 August 2005 <http: www.matangitonga.to> 
(last accessed 17 August 2005): latangi Tonga Online "Lopeti pushes for Tongan Constitutional Review" 3 
February 2005 <http: www.matangitonga.to> (last accessed 17 ugust 2005); Lopeti Senituli "Basic Proposal for 
an Alternative Structure of Government for Tonga (Draft 4)'"30 August 2002 <http: //wv.'W.planet-tonga.com> (last 
accessed 6 June 2005): \ illiam Clive Edwards ··Proposal for Constitutional Changes lo Provide for a 
Democraticall) Elected Government for the People of Tonga" 27 July 2005 <http://planet-tonga.com> (last 
accessed 13 September 2005); Matangi Tonga Online ' ·Laki iu starts new protest at Pangai-Si'i on Monday" 16 
October 2005 <www.malangitonga.to> (last accessed 18 October 2005). 
55 Karin on Strokirch, Karin "Political Reviews: The Region in Re iew: International Issues and Events, 2004 
[2005) 17(2) The Contemporary Pacific 416, 424. ["on Strokirch] 
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included repeated changes of governments and allegations of bribery and forgery among 
politicians. Such instability has the potential to spark further violence between ethnic groups, 
particular! bet\ een the ethnic groups of the Tongoans and Tannese; and also further threats of 
coup d'etats from the Police. and mutinies in the Vanuatu Mobile Force.56 
In summary, peace and security crises in the Pacific are likely to be predominantly non-
international am,ed conflicts. rather than international. The recent non-international armed 
conflicts had the same features of suffering and destruction as other armed conflicts around the 
world. although , ith less intensity. The results however, were serious as they impacted on 
small States. not used to. nor able to deal with such conflicts. More importantly, although these 
crises ha e subsided. there is opportunity for armed conflict to break out again in any of these 
three countries, along\,\ ith a few others. 
What then does the Pacific Islands Forum have set up to address future peace and 
securit crises? 
B The Pacific Islands Forum 
1 Historical Background 
The challenges of a vast geography, cultural diversity, small economies of scale and 
limited resources. unites 16 states of the Pacific region, who are self-governing, to pursue 
regional cooperation under the Pacific Island Forum (the Forum). 57 The Forum was first set up 
in 1971. and\ as initially known as the South Pacific Forum. It changed its name in 1999 due to 
the inclusion of Palau from the orth Pacific. 58 The Forum does not have a "formal 
56 von Strokirch, abo,·e n 55,423; Anita Jowitt '"Political Re, iews: Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events, 2004: 
Vanuatu·' [2005] 17(2) The Contemporary Pacific 456, 457-458. 
57 The present members of the Forum are: Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati , 
auru, ew Zealand, iue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, larshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu 
and Vanuatu. ew Caledonia, French Polynesia, Timore-Leste and Tokelau attended the 2005 Forum in Papua 
ew Guinea as Obser ers. 
58 Thirtieth South Pacific Forum Communique, Koror, Republic of Palau, 3-5 October I 999, para 5. 
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constitution" and technically therefore has no legal personality in international relations. 59 
Decisions of the Forum are based on the principle of the "Pacific Way'' which is based on 
"unanimous compromise", where ever one sacrifices something for the overall benefit of the 
whole. and all decisions are made by consensus.60 In October 2005 the 36th Forum Leaders' 
Meeting held in Papua ew Guinea adopted a new "Agreement Establishing the Pacific Islands 
Forum" which finally established a formal status to the Forum along with its own rules and 
procedures.
61 
The Agreement however is still open for signature of the Forum States. 
The Forum was established as a result of dissatisfaction by the independent Pacific 
f sland States. at the time, with the pre-eminent regional organisation of the time, the South 
Pacific Commission (the Commission).62 The Commission was set up by the colonial powers of 
the region in 1947 in order to look afterthe '·welfare of their holdings".63 The role of the island 
States in the triennial meeting of the Commission was only advisory relating to the projects 
implemented by the powers in the region. Another cornerstone policy of the Commission was 
the restriction of discussion of issues, ith political implications. 
In August 1971 the first meeting of the Forum was held in Wellington with 
representatives from the Cook Islands, Fiji, auru, Tonga and Western Samoa, with New 
Zealand and Australia as observers. New Zealand and Australia became full members in the 
next meeting in 1972, held in Canberra, on the grounds that they would provide significant 
funding and a more recognisable voice on the international stage for the small Pacific Island 
States.64 Since 1971 the Forum Leaders have met annually in each Member State in the last 33 
years usually based on alphabetical rotation.65 
59 
Eric Shibuya 'The Problems and Potential of the Pacific Islands Fon11n" in Jim Rolfe The Asia-Pac(fic: A 
Region in Transition (Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies. Honolulu, 2004), I 05. [Shibuya] 
60 Shibuya, above n 59, 103. 
61 
Thi1ty-Sixth Pacific Islands Forum Communique, Papua ew Guinea, 25-27 October 2005, para 6. [2005 Forum 
Communique] 
62 Shibu) a, above n 59, I 03. 
63 
The colonial powers were: the United States. France, the etherlands, the United Kingdom, Australia and ew 
Zealand. The Commission is now known as the Secretariat for the Pacific Community (SPC). 
64 
Shibuya, above n 59, 105. 
65 The 37lh Pacific Islands Forum Meeting\ ill be held in Tonga in 2005. 
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2 Structure and Administration 
The Agenda of the Forum Leader's meeting 1s prepared by the Forum Officials' 
Committee a couple of day prior toe er) Forum Leaders' Meeting.66 There are three stages to 
Forum meetings. First. the Forum Leaders go on a Retreat where the hard issues are 
constructi el discussed on an informal basis. This is followed by the formal Plenary Meeting. 
At the conclusion of the Plenary Meeting. a Post-Forum Dialogue meeting is held between 
representatives of the Forum and senior Ministers and officials of 12 States and regional 
organisations.67 The objecti e of the Dialogue is to allow the Forum. as a collective of Pacific 
States. to consult a,,. ider international audience on a bilateral basis. 
A level below the Forum Leaders' Meeting. regional security matters are dea lt with at 
the ministerial level by the Forum Foreign Affairs Ministers Meeting (FF AMM). Further down 
at the officials' level. regional security is dealt with b the Forum Regional Security Committee 
(FRSC). The FRSC is the working committee on regional security, and meets annually to 
coordinate la\\ enforcement activities and regional security issues. The FRSC also receives 
reports from other regional security based organisations such as the Pacific Immigration 
Directors· Conference. the Pacific Islands Chief of Police Conference, the Pacific Islands Law 
Officers Meeting. the Pacific Immigration Directors Conference and the Oceania Customs 
Organisation, including observers. such as the Commonwealth Secretariat. 
The Forum is supported by the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (Forum Secretariat) 
which is located in Suva.68 The Forum Secretariat is headed by a Secretary-General. 69 Within 
66 FOC comprises senior representatives from all Forum members, and is the governing body of the Forum 
Secretariat. FOC also appro\es the Budget and~ ork Programme of the Forum Secretariat in a separate meeting. 
67 Canada, China, the European Union, France, India, Indonesia, Japan , South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, United 
Kingdom and nited States. 
08 The Forum Secretariat was established in 1972 under a multi-lateral agreement, and was initially a Trade Bureau 
known as the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation: Second South Pacific Forum Communique, 
Canberra, 23-25 Februa() 1972. [ 1972 Forum Communique] 
09 Mr Greg Urwin, a former diplomat of the Australian Government, is the current Secretary General, and took 
office in January 2004 for a three-year term. He is the first non-Pacific islander to be appointed Secretary-General. 
Previous Secret3()-Generals have been from Tonga. Papua ew Guinea. Tuvalu and Kiribati . 
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the Forum Secretariat there are four Divisions. 70 The Forum's budget is apportioned on the 
basis of one third each to Australia. Ne\\ Zealand and the Islands as a group responsible for the 
remaining one-third.71 Regional securit) is handled by the Secretariat's Political, International 
and Legal Affairs Di ision. ,, hich also deals with law enforcement cooperation, legal, and 
political matters. The Di ision is headed b a Director and suppo11ed by three advisers that deal 
with legal, political and international issues, respectively, plus law enforcement consultants. 
In the Forum Meeting in 2003, held in Auckland, the Forum Leaders agreed to carry out 
a revie, of the Forum and its Secretariat in order to advance regional cooperation and 
integration. 72 A Forum Eminent Persons Group (Forum EPG) was appointed by the Forum 
Leaders and their findings and recommendations were released in April 2004.73 The security 
aspects of the re iev. are dealt with below. 
3 The Forum and Regional Peace and Security 
So far as the Forum is concerned. securit) in the Pacific context is seen in its wider 
meaning, which includes both traditional and non-traditional security threats. Regional peace 
and security , as first raised in relation to the threat of Communism in the 1970s. Forum 
members howe er have always steered clear of intervening or discussing internal peace and 
securit cnses. These matters were taboo based on the respect for the principles of state 
sovereignty, non-intervention and equality of nations. The rise of peace and security threats and 
crises. which threatens the region ·s security, as broadly defined, has however forced the Forum 
to change its stance to an extent. 
The Forum first attempted to establish regional peace and security cooperation when it 
adopted the "A itutaki Declaration on Regional Security Cooperation" (Aitutaki) in its 1997 
70 The four divisions are: Development and Economic Division; Trade and Investment Division; Political , 
International and Legal Affairs Di ision; and the Corporate Services Division. 
71 1972 Forum Communique, above n 68, 2. 
72 Thirty-Fourth Pacific Islands Forum Communique, Auckland, ew Zealand, 14-16 August 2003, para 58-61. 
73 Sir Julius Chan, Bob Cotton, Dr. Langi Kavaliku, Teburoro Tito Maiava lulai Toma Pacific Cooperation: Voices 
of the Region The Eminent Persons ' Group Revim of the Pac(fic Islands Forwn, April 200./ (forum Secretariat, 
Suva, 2004). (EPG Forum Review 2004] 
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meeting in the Cook Islands. 74 Aitutaki was the first regional statement on proactively dealing 
with peace and security crises.75 The aim of Aitutaki was "to further strengthen the region's 
security en ironmenC. 76 The Forum Leaders expressed their commitment to "dialogue on 
political and security issues'' based on the members collectively dealing with political and 
security issues and situations.77 The Forum Leaders agreed that a regional approach to security 
was required and, that the practice of good governance, sustainable development and 
international cooperation \\Ould improve regional security. The Leaders also recognised the 
need to eliminate ''causes of conflict''. and use peaceful means to resolve conflicts including 
customary practices. Practical cooperation was also called for. Aitutaki also laid the foundation 
for regional response using "preventi e diplomacy'' and the "the region's disciplined forces", 
and tasked the FRSC to administer regional responses.78 
The second attempt by the Forum was instigated in August 2000 in a special meeting of 
the FF AMM convened in Apia. This meeting was done ''in response to approaches from 
members for an opportunity to discuss de elopments in the region's security environment 
relating to the Fiji and Solomon Islands crises".79 In opening that meeting the Samoan Prime 
Minister clarified that ··existing Forum arrangements do not prescribe a process for 
implementing a Forum response·' to security crises, and explained that:80 
In a sense the studied procrastination of the Forum in not having in place an effective response 
mechanism is rooted on our long held belief that we were blessed with a truly tranquil region. It 
was admittedly a comforting vision and such was the depth of this complacency that the earlier 
coups in Fiji were somehow viewed as having a special and palatable Pacific flavour and were 
therefore considered merely aberrations to the otherwise underlying peaceful and serene nature 
of our traditional societies. 
74 Aitutaki Declaration on Regional Security Cooperation, Annex 2 to the 1997 Forum Communique. [Aitutaki 
Declaration] 
75 Aitutaki Declaration, above n 74, para 2. 
76 Twenty-Eighth South Pacific Forum Communique, Rarotonga, Cook Islands, 17-19 September 1997, para 22. 
77 Aitutaki Declaration, abo e n 74. paras 9-10. 
78 Aitutaki Declaration, above n 74, paras l 1-14. 
79 Thirt)-First Paci fie Islands Forum Communique, Tarawa, Republic of Kiribati, 27-30 October 2000, para 7. 
pooo Forum Communique] 
0 Hon Tuilaepa Sailele lalielegaoi, Prime Minister of Samoa, Opening Statement (Forum Foreign Affairs 
Ministers leeting, Apia, 10 August 2000) <htip: /www.forumsec.org.fj> (last accessed 9 October 2005). 
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The result of that meeting was the formal condemnation of the May 2000 coup in Fiji 
and the welcoming of the (temporar ) cease-fire in the Solomon Islands. This was only the 
second time a meeting of the Forum had ever discussed and made a statement concerning any 
security crise \\ ithin a Forum member's borders. The first was in 1997 in relation to the 
Bougain ille conflict but that was only to note the progress in achie ing peace. 81 The Ministers 
then established a working group to draft principles and options for consideration at the next 
meeting of the Forum Leaders. 
In October 2000 the Forum Leaders met in Kiribati. High on the agenda were the crises 
m Fiji and the Solomon Islands. The Forum highlighted the shift in the Forum members' 
ideology that a response to security crises was required when it stated in its communique that:82 
The Forum expressed grave concern that, since its last meeting in Palau in I 999, the region's 
security ell\ironment had become more unstable. Leaders recognized the urgent need to address 
some of the fundamental causes of political instability in the region associated with ethnic 
tensions, socio economic disparity, lack of good governance, land disputes. and erosion of 
cultural values, all of which required deeper understanding and action. 
During their Forum Retreat at Biketawa Atoll the Leaders agreed on a set of principles, 
courses of action and guidelines to use \ hen the Forum may respond to a crisis within the 
borders of a Forum State. These were compiled in what became known as the Biketawa 
Declaration (Biketawa).83 
.J The Forum ·s Aitufaki and Biketawa Declarations 
itutaki had set the platform for regional security cooperation; however it was Biketawa 
that ga e the Aitutaki principles some practical substance for a proactive regional security 
response. The noble Aitutaki principles - regional approach, good leadership, averting causes 
of conflict. peaceful resolution of conflict, practical cooperation and regional intervention -
81 Stewart Firth·· Reflection on South Pacific Regional ecurity, mid-2000 to mid-200 I" (200 I] 36 The Journal 
of Pacific History 277,278. [Firth] 
8
~ 2000 Forum Communique, abo en 79, para 8. 
81 2000 Forum Communique, above n 79, ttachment I. [Biketawa Declaration] 
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were moulded to form Biketm: a. The Forum Leaders however were still unwilling to fully 
embrace the Aitutaki principles and erode some of their sovereignty. 
In Biketawa the Forum Leaders, first, emphasised their adherence to the principles of 
"non-interference in domestic affairs of another member state". Any Forum response to any 
domestic crisi must therefore be by consent of the concerned government. The Forum Leaders 
then went on to express their commitment to the principles of: good governance; liberty of the 
individual under the law: and upholding democratic processes and institutions.84 Moreover, the 
leaders recognised the: importance and urgency of equitable economic, social and cultural 
development; importance of respecting and protecting indigenous rights and cultural values. 
traditions and customs: vulnerability of member States to threats to their security and the 
importance of cooperation among members when such threats arise; importance of averting the 
causes of conflict and of reducing, containing and resolving all conflicts by peaceful means. 85 
The Forum Leaders went on to recognise that action must be taken "in time of crisis'' or 
"in response to members' request for assistance''. and that such action however should be taken 
on the basis of collecti e response to crisis.86 Forum response to a security crisis may therefore 
be instigated in h\O ,\ays. First, the Forum ma respond if it determines a situation amounts to 
a security "crisis". As set b Aitutaki, "security" is seen in its broad context, involving political, 
economical. en ironmental and social crises. Secondly, the Forum may respond when a Forum 
State requests Forum assistance. Any regional response to a crisis was to take account of 
principles which included: consultation with national authorities; credibility of personnel 
invol ed: coherent and consistent strategy; continuity and conclusiveness of process; 
cooperation with other organisations; sufficient degree of consensus by all involved; and, cost-
effecti e responses.87 
The Forum Leaders therefore accepted that they must "constructively address difficult 
and sensitive issues" including underlying causes of tensions and conflict. They recognised the 
84 Biketawa Declaration. above n 83. clau e l(i)-(iii). 
85 Biketawa Declaration, abo en 83, clause l(i )-(vii). 
86 Biketawa Declaration, above n 83, clause 2. 
87 Biketawa Declaration, above n 83, Annex. 
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impo1tant and prevalent causes of conflict to be ethnic tension , socio-economic disparities. lack 
of good go ernance. land disputes and erosion of cultural values. The Forum was thus prepared 
finall) to face the sensiti e issues, hich traditionally were ignored and considered outside the 
scope of the Forum. Ho,,e er, such ,, illingness to respond seems to be still subject to consent 
of the concerned State. 
On the administrative side. the Forum Leaders charged the Secretary General of the 
Forum to implement Biketawa and its four step process. When a situation arises, the Secretary-
GeneraL first, must consult the Forum Chair. From there the Secretary-General then assesses 
the situation and makes a judgment on the significance of the development. Before any 
proacti e action is taken. the Secretary General must consult the Chair of the Forum, and other 
Forum Leaders. as may be feasible, to get appro al to initiate further action. Secondly, the 
national authorities are consulted regarding assistance available from the Forum. Thirdly, the 
Secretary-General must then advise and consult the Forum Foreign Ministers. Based on these 
consultations the Secretary General must then carry out specified actions. Fourthly, if these 
measures do not mitigate or resolve the crisis, the Secretary General may then convene a 
meeting of the Forum Leaders to consider options, including ''targeted measures". 
RAMS! was the first time Biketa\ a was used by the Forum. Biketawa was utilised a 
second time at the 2004 Forum Meeting held in Samoa when the Forum leaders approved the 
Pacific Regional Assistance to Nauru (PRAN), after that country suffered severe economic 
crisis. 88 The Forum leaders recognised that the auru crisis ''threatened its security and national 
stability'·. The 2005 Forum Meeting noted the assistance that was provided for Nauru. 89 
In summary, the Pacific Islands Forum is in reality just a forum where the independent 
Pacific Island States. together with their more powerful traditional neighbours, Australia and 
New Zealand. meet to discuss common issues and agree on regional cooperation based on 
consensus. The Forum's security framework is, however, a recent development, in recognition 
88 Thiny-Fi fth Pacific Islands forum Communique, Apia, Samoa, 5-7 ugust 2004. para 26. 
89 2005 Forum Communique, above n 61. para 13. 
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that a regional approach to peace and security concerns is vital for achieving the Forum's more 
pressing economic and social goals. 
What then are the grounds to justify formalising the Forum ' s peace and security 
framework? 
C Why Formalise the Forum's Peace and Security Framework? 
I Lack of Legal Status.for Ailulaki and Biketawa 
Although Biketawa was seen as ground-breaking for the Forum by finally giving itself a 
mechanism to deal with peace and security crises that occur within borders of Forum members, 
there are some identifiable shortfalls. First. Biketawa is a political instrument, not a legal one 
with binding powers over the Forum States. This is a direct victim of the Forum's informal 
status. Since 1971 the Forum has been operating without a formal constitution and so its 
commitments are mere!} political, rather than legaL which \\Ould make commitments 
obligatory. 
Second! , the Forum in reality does not have a leading role in peace and security 
matters.90 In the Bougainville conflict Australia and New Zealand pressed for the peace talks. 
The first peace agreement in the Solomon Islands was brokered by Envoy sent by the 
Commom ealth Secretariat. Presently, the regional framework can only be fully implemented 
with Australian and. or Ne, Zealand support. If it suits these States to respond, then a response 
will be made. We ha e seen above that RAMS! is an Australian intervention under the banner 
of the Forum. When the Solomon I lands government was after external assistance, it 
approached Australia, not the Forum. A formalised framework would place the Forum in an 
authoritative seat to require all Forum States to respond, rather than the other way round. 
Thirdly, the lack of legal status is politically disadvantageous to Australia and New 
Zealand. A formalised regional organisation that would take a leading role in regional peace 
qo Firth, above n 82, 279. 
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and security "'ould repel claims of neo-colonialism and intervention made against Australia and 
New Zealand. It could a oid any Forum response from being influenced by the national interest 
of the dominating State. It could also legitimise action that may be seen as unilateral initiatives. 
Moreo er. a Forum response could be a regional response, with prominent roles shared by all 
Forum State . In Ma) 2005 an Eminent Persons Group, set up by the Forum. reviewed RAMSI 
and recommended that RAMSI has to be seen to be a regional exercise and that more "Pacific 
representation in both policing and ci ilian component should be strengthened where 
possible".91 
2 Gaps in Biketawa 's Armour 
There seems to be gaps in Biketawa·s armour. This was clearly raised by the Forum 
EPG convened to review the Forum. According to the Forum EPG there was ''widespread 
agreement that regional effort on trans-national and regional security crisis need to be harnessed 
effectively", however they understandably did not detail the shortfalls or what was fully 
required.92 The author identifies the folio, ing features. 
First. regional response under the Biketav a Declaration ignores two possible scenarios 
in traditional peace and security crises. The first scenario is when armed conflict escalates to the 
point where there is no functioning government to issue the invitation for regional assistance. 
The Solomon Islands conflict went close to this scenario as the militants gained a stranglehold 
on the near failed government. The second scenario is ,,hen a government refuses to issue an 
invitation although there are clear signs of a peace and security crisis. The Bougainvi I le conflict 
took nearly a decade before seeking the assistance of the Australians and New Zealanders to 
assist in negotiating a ceasefire and after atrocities were committed by each hostile party. 
Secondly, Biketawa does not clarify what targeted measures are available. They are left 
to be discussed and agreed upon when diplomatic measures fail. The absence of a clear 
expression in Biketa,, a seems to provide no legal basis for the type of measures the Forum can 
91 
Forum RAMSI Review, above n 38, para I 0. 
92 EPG Forum Re iew 2004, above n 73, 23, 
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invoke. This uncertaint~ could create legal issues as to the Forum's power to invoke "targeted 
measures'·. A Forum State may criticise the legality of any "targeted measures'' the Forum 
Leaders may impose. This could thus tarnish Forum legitimacy. 
3 'Serious Harm· Features in Recent Crises 
Non-international armed conflicts in the Pacific, although of low intensity compared to 
armed conflicts around the world. could pose a serious regional peace and security threat 
because it has severe repercussions on small and fragile island communities directly and, also to 
the region in its efforts to maintain a reputation of stability for investment opportunities and 
much needed tourism activity.93 
This was evident in Fiji and the Solomon Islands. Looters and militants attacked 
undefended businesses and homes. Expatriates and tourists were harassed and assaulted for 
money. Extortion was practiced on banks, businesses and the government.94 Moreover, in the 
Solomon Islands. peace negotiators were murdered, ' 'extraordinarily barbaric acts of 
retribution·· was committed against villagers, and capti es were tortured and subjected to 
inhumane treatment. 95 The defilement of the dead was practiced in the Solomon Islands. 
Furthennore. there were se ere injuries and suffering inflicted with machetes and home-made 
or high powered guns stolen from government armouries. In Bougainville there were reports or 
extrajudicial killings and disappearances, and firing into crowds. 
Moreover. go ernment officials and politicians either suppotted or encouraged the 
violations that occurred. In the Solomon Islands politicians and police officers suppotted the 
hostile patties. 96 In Fiji, politicians. social leaders and soldiers supported the coup. These 
persons not on!) ignored the rule of law but also their own fellow citizens. They were clearl) 
corrupted by prejudice, customary loyalties and greed. In such a situation hope for domestic 
redemption and resolution was unreal. The only viable option is hope for some external 
93 von Strokirch, above n 55, 422. 
94 
Fraenkel, abo e n 21, 152. 
95 Fraenkel, above n 21, 154-157. 
96 Kabutaulaka II, above n 29, 6; Fraenkel , above n, 64. 
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intervention. Although the atrocities inflicted in these conflicts, particularly in the Solomon 
Islands and Fiji, ha e been dealt with through national judicial systems, the shortfall 1s some 
may ha e escaped justice, especially those who masterminded the respective crises. 97 
Finally, Pacific conflicts are based on complex interaction of various factors and so 
early and cohesive response could avoid the crisis quickly escalating into a humanitarian 
concern. In 2000 Professor Ron Crocombe reported that:98 
The main instances of o e1t conflict in the Pacific in the past 20 years have involved a 
combination of ethnic tensions (whether among Pacific Islanders, or between Islanders and 
immigrants). land disputes, economic disparities, and a lack of confidence in government's ability 
or willingness to solve the problems. These elements usually co-exist before a security breakdown 
occurs. 
Dr. Ratuva however believes that those are the ·'obvious factors·· which ignores the 
''more subtle, more complex and equally important ones", and suggests that: 99 
Political stability is not an isolated phenomenon dri, en purely by political forces - it is also 
shaped and driven by social. economic and cultural factors in complex ways. Thus national 
security must be an inclusive concept encompassing a variety of issues which impinge on people's 
sense of safety and welfare. state stability. community survival and sustenance of society 
generally. 
Both Crocombe and Ratu\a agree that conflicts in the Pacific are always most likely to 
be multi-dimensional. and so attempts to prevent, resolve and re-build have to be equa lly multi-
dimensional. The complexities of Pacific non-international armed conflicts are therefore likely 
to quickly heighten armed conflict to intense levels once initiated, and can also prolong it 
making resolution challenging. Timely action is therefore of the essence. This can be provided 
97 
Wainwright, above n 35, 5. 
98 Ron Crocombe '·Enhancing Pacific Security" (Forum Regional Security Comminee Meeting, Port Vila, 13- I 5 
July 2000) 3. 
99 
Dr. Steven Ratuva '·Pacific Islands States Security Issues" (Forum Regional Security Committee Meeting, 
Auckland, 15 June 2005) 2. 
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by a framev ork that drives and legalises appropriate regional response, rather than reliance on 
the political" ill of States . 
./ Developing Foru,11 Regionalism 
The regional political climate is pro iding an opportunity for the Forum to formalise 
regional peace and securit). In 2001 the Forum members signed the Pacific Agreement on 
Closer Economic Relations (PACER) and the Pacific Island States Trade Agreement (PICTA), 
illustrating a regional intention and effort to form an economic community. PACER and PICTA 
success ould depend on a peaceful and secure region, so effective regional peace and security 
cooperation would be imperative. 
In April 2004 the 16 Forum Leaders met in Auckland to consider the Forum EPG's 
Review of the Forum. The Forum EPG recommended a vision statement. which was adopted by 
the Forum Leaders and released in the form of the Auckland Declaration. The vision is: 100 
Leaders believe the Pacific can. should and will be a region of peace, hannony, security and 
economic prosperity, so that all its people can lead free and worthwhile lives. We treasure the 
diversity of the Pacific and seek a future in which its cultures, traditions and religious beliefs are 
valued, honoured and developed. \\ 'e seek a Pacific region that is respected for the quality of its 
governance, the sustainable management of its resources, the full observance of democratic 
values, and for its defence and promotion of human rights. We seek partnerships with our 
neighbours and beyond to de elop our knowledge, to improve our communications and to ensure 
a sustainable economic existence. 
After the 2005 Forum in PNG the Forum Leaders agreed to ''adopt a new Agreement 
Establishing the Pacific Islands Forum'' which ··establishes the Pacific Islands Forum as an 
intergo ernmental organisation at international law'', and updates the Forum's purpose and 
functions to reflect the ision and directions taken under the Pacific Plan". 10 1 The Pacific Plan 
was adopted by the Forum Leaders in 2005 as the Kalibobo Roadmap, based on four pillars of 
economic growth, sustainable development, good governance and security for the Pacific 
100 
The Auckland Declaration, Pacific Islands Forum Special Leaders Retreat, Auckland, 6 April 2004. 101 2005 Forum Communique, above n 61, para 6. 
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through regionalism . 102 The security aspect of the Roadmap however focuses on addressing 
non-traditional securit_ threats. These de elopments have laid the foundation that would allow 
the formalisation of the Forum and its mechanisms. particularly for peace and security as a 
foundation for economic prosperity and social development. 
5 United Nations Recognition 
There seems to be a shift in thinking in the universal body to engage the regional 
organisations to share the UN's responsibility to maintain international peace and security. 103 In 
September 2004 the UN Secretary General presented a report to the U General Assembly on 
''Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and other organisations". which 
included the Forum. 104 Following that repo1i, in November 2004 the UN General Assembly 
passed a resolution noting the developments in the Forum. and called for further and continued 
cooperation and support from the UN. 105 In particular. it called for contributions to the 
Biketawa Trust Fund. and training on ''preventive diplomacy and post-conflict resolution". 
In September 2005, the UN General Assembly adopted the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome where the World Leaders supported a stronger relationship between the U and 
regional organisations, and to expand consultation and cooperation through formalised 
agreements. 106 The World Summit Outcome was then suppo11ed by the Security Council when 
it expressed its determination to cooperate with regional organisations under Chapter VIII of 
the UN Chaiter. 107 The Forum. as the pre-eminent regional organisation, should therefore equip 
itself\\ ith the necessar) framework and tools to work with the UN, pa11icularly on international 
peace and security matters on a regional level. 
102 2005 Forum Communique, abo en 61, Annex A. 
103 Kennedy Graham '"A 'global-regional security mechanism': an emerging vision of global security?" (2005] 6 
ew Zealand International Review 2. 4. 
104 UNGA Report "Cooperation between the United ations and regional and other organizations: Report of the 
Secretar)-General" (1 September 2004) N59/303. [U Cooperation Report] 
105 UNGA Resolution 59/20 (8 ovember 2004) A/RES/59/20. 
106 UNGA Resolution 60/ 1 (16 September 2005) RES/60/ 1 para 170. [World Summit Outcome] 
107 SC Resolution 1631 ( 17 October 2005) S RES/ 1631 (2005) para I. 
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In summar_, there is an opportunity now to formalise the mandate of the Forum 
concerning peace and security matters based on a number of factors. First, the Forum's security 
framework does not ha e any legal status that would drive timely and effective regional 
response and. its peace and securit framework has significant gaps. Moreover, peace and 
security crises in the Pacific provoked serious international law concerns because they involved 
violations of human rights laws and international humanitarian laws. Furthermore, the Forum, 
as a gathering. is considering a formali sed arrangement. More importantly. the UN is moving 
towards addressing international peace and security on a regional level with the Forum. 
What then are the international law issues that a formalised regional peace and security 
body could face? 
Ill INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES 
A Dealing with States' Sovereignty 
Since peace and security crisis in the Pacific are likely to be non-international armed 
conflicts. regional responses would undoubtedly interfere with a State's sovereignty. unless the 
State in ites such a response. This means the foremost legal issue the Forum may face is 
negotiating \ ith the sensitive international law principles of States sovereignty and non-
inter ention. 
I Humanitarian Intervention 
Thi1teen Forum States are full members of the UN, and are therefore bound by the 
United Nations Charter (the UN Charter). 108 Although the other three are not members of the 
UN, the UN security framework is the benchmark to gain international legitimacy and 
support. 109 The UN emphasises the principle of state sovereignty under article 2( I) of the U 
108 Charter of the United Nations (26 June I 945) 59 Stat I 031 ; 145 UKFS 805. [U Charter] 
109 Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia and iue are not members of the UN. 
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Charter by stating that the UN is based on the "'so ereign equality" of all its Members. This is 
supported by the principle of non-intervention in article 2(7) in the following terms: 
othing contained in the present Cha11er shall authorize the United ations to intervene in matters 
which are essentiall) within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to 
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice 
the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VIL 
The N principles of States so ereignty and non-intervention are based on traditional 
international la\\ v;hich pro ides that States are regarded as equals regardless of their resources 
and size. These principles ensure that international relations can be conducted in an orderly and 
stable international en ironment and with certainty. 
These principles however have been challenged, particularly in the context of traditional 
peace and security crises that in olves the use of force. The emergence of the concept of 
·'humanitarian intervention'' provides "intervention ... to protect the lives of persons situated 
within a particular state and not necessarily nationals of the intervening state·'.110 The Economic 
Community of West African States' (ECOWAS) intervention in Liberia's civil war in 1990 was 
a humanitarian response after 5,000 people were killed and 500,000 fled for safety during 
Liberia's civil \i ar. The ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone in 1997 was also based on 
humanitarian grounds after the cease fire that had ended a six year civil war collapsed. That 
previous conflict had resulted in a high number of casualties and refugees. and destruction of 
the country's infrastructure. 
Thirdly, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NA TO) air offensive in Kosovo in 
1999 was a response to Serbian atrocities. Russia and China however objected to NA TO 
justifying its actions on humanitarian grounds as this was not recognised in the U Charter, nor 
was it part of customary international law. 111 Russia's and China's view illustrate that there is 
disagreement about "whether there is a right of intervention, how and when it should be 
110 Malcolm Shaw International Law (5ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003) I 045. [Shaw] 111 
Thomas M. Franck Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threat and Armed A flacks (Cambridge niversity 
Press, London, 2002) 167. [Franck] 
32 
exercised. and under whose authorit) ... 112 When referring to the UN Charter there certainly is 
no express or implied pro ision that would support ''humanitarian interventions". 113 
2 The Emerging Principle ofLhe "Responsibili(y to Protect " 
The shortfalls of the principle of humanitarian intervention however have led to a re-
characterisation of the concept of States sovereignty. This emerged with the report of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICJSS) which created the 
principle of the "responsibility to protect". 114 This principle highlights that "[t]here is a 
necessar re-characterization'· of State so ereignt ''from sovereignty as control to sovereignty 
as responsibi!ily in both [a tates] internal functions and external duties". State sovereignty was 
thus "re-characterized .. to mean that States ha e. first, the responsibility for the '·protection of 
its people'·. and secondly, '·where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal 
war. insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to 
halt or avert it. the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to 
protect". 1 15 
The responsibility to protect .. embraces three specific responsibilities .. to: (i) prevent the 
breakout of armed conflict by addressing the "root causes'' of conflict; (ii) react to situations of 
·'compelling human need with appropriate measures"; and. (iii) rebuild by providing "full 
assistance \ ith recover •. reconstruction and reconciliation. addressing the causes of the harm 
the intervention \\as designed to half". 11 6 The ICISS also admirably sets out the framework for 
invoking military intervention under the responsibility to protect. 117 
11
~ Gareth Evans and lohamed Sahnoun "The Responsibility to Protect" [2002] Foreign Affairs, 99. 99. 113 Jutta Brunnee and Stephen J Toope "The se of Force: International Law After Iraq" [2004] 53 ICLQ 785, 800. 
[Brunnee and Toope] 
114 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty The Responsibility to Protect (International 
Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 200 I), <http:www.idrc.ca> (last accessed 23 ovember 2005). [ICISS 
Report] 
115 ICISS Report, above n 114, XI. 
116 ICISS Report, above n 114, XI. 
117 ICISS Report, abo en I 14, XII-XI 11. 
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The principle \\as supported by the U Secretary-General's High-level Panel on 
Threats. Challenge and Change ,,hen they were of the view that "States not only benefit from 
the pri ileges of so ereignty but also accept its responsibilities", and that it is clear that State 
sovereignty "clearly carries with it the obligation of a State to protect the welfare of its own 
people and meet its obligations to the wider international community". 118 This new 
characterisation of State sovereignty has therefore created "conditional sovereignty'', where 
States must hold true to their political commitments. 119 In the recent World Summit, the 
World's leaders embraced the concept as it applies to the protection of citizens from genocide. 
war crimes. ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and stated their willingness to resort 
to the collective use of force if citizens are not protected from such atrocities. 120 This indicates 
that the concept has attained the status of customary international law, but only in relation to 
ce1tain international crimes. A fundamental shift in international law has therefore occurred 
where '·people are more important than State sovereignty". 121 
In summary, States' sovereignty is challenged by the principles of humanitarian 
intervention and the responsibility to protect. Humanitarian intervention however is not a 
principle supported by the different forms of international law. The "responsibility to protect" 
concept hO\ ever seems to have attained customary international law status in relation to the 
most serious international crimes. This means States have accepted that its internal functions 
are now subject to external supervision by other States if they cause serious harm. On that basis 
regional intervention may result, which may include the use of force without the invitation of 
the State concerned. For the Pacific region, non-international armed conflicts provide an 
opportunity for justified intervention if a crisis involves the threat or commission of serious 
international crimes. 
118 UN Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change A More Secure World: Our 
Shared Respo11sibi/ity, Report o_f the Secreta1}'-General 's High-le1•e/ Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 
<http:WW\ .un.org> (last accessed 25 November 2005) para 29. 
119 Anne-Marie Slaughter "Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of U Reform" [2005] 99 
A.IIL 619,628. 
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B The Use of Force 
l Universal Prohibition 
One of the core purposes of the UN is to maintain international peace and security. 122 
The UN·s Securit Council holds the .. primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security'·.123 Under article 2( 4) of the UN Charter the use of force is 
prohibited in the following terms: 124 
All Members shall refrain in there international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrit) or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the nited ations. 
The prohibition of use of force hm ever has two exceptions. First, article 51 of the UN 
Charter pro ides a state or a collective of states the "inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence'· if subjected to armed attack. State or collective self-defence however expires 
when the Security Council has "taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
securit~ ". 
Secondly, under Chapter VrI of the UN Charter, the Security Council has the authority 
to direct the use of force once it determines that a dispute or situation amounts to a " threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace. or act of aggression' .. 125 After making such a determination the 
Securit Council ma make recommendations, or impose enforcement action. The latter may 
consist of economic sanctions. or the use of force in order to "maintain or restore international 
peace and security". 126 Military action authorised by the Security Council then falls on the 
Member States undertaking to make a ailable to the Security Council under special agreement 
··armed forces. assistance. and facilities. including rights of passage''. 127 The sanctions made b1 
122 UN Charter, abo en 108, art 1(1). 
123 UN Charter, above n l 08. art 24( I). 
124 U Charter, abo\e n 108, art 2(4). 
125 UN Charter, above n 108, art 39. 
P6 - U Charter, above 11 I 08, arts 41 and 42. 
127 U Charter, above n I 08, art 43. 
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the Securit, Council are binding on all UN Member States. 128 The Security Council is therefore 
the pre-eminent executive body that deals with international peace and security on a universal 
level. 
During the years of the Cold \ ar the Security Council was handicapped by the 
polarisation of ideologies between East and West, and the veto became a political weapon. This 
led to the General Assembly adopting the ··Uniting for Peace" Resolution (the Resolution) 
which provided the Assembly the abilit} to consider international peace and security matters 
when the Security Council failed to do so. 129 The resolution allowed the Assembly to authorise, 
recruit. and deploy military force necessary to allow it to fulfil its mission. 130 The Resolution 
was used to send peacekeeping troops during the Suez crisis of 1956, and enforcement action in 
the Congo in 1960. Concerns of the constitutionality of the resolution was put to rest by the 
International Court of Justice when a majorit opined that it was lawful for the Assembly to 
exercise the UN's responsibility for maintaining international peace and security when the 
Securit, Council was unable to do so. 131 The General Assembly therefore is another limb to the 
universal security framework, but it can only be utilised in the event of the Security Council not 
exercising its powers fully. 
Due to the pre alence of non-international armed conflicts in the post-Cold War years 
the Security Council has responded in practice by determining that internal armed conflicts may 
threaten international peace and security when they involve the denial of self-determination, 
civil wars. widespread abuse of human rights, or they have consequences of destabilizing 
neighbouring states or drav. in outside po\ ers. 132 This was clearly done in the conflicts in the 
former Yugosla ia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Iraq's suppression of the Kurdish population. 
128 U Charter, above n I 08, art 48. 
129 UNG Resolution 377 ( ) (3 ovember 1950). 
13° Franck, abo\'e n 111 , 37. 
131 Certain E.xpenses of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1962] ICJ Rep 151 , 163. 132 Hilaire Mccoubrey and igel D. White International Organi~atirm · and Civil Wars (Dartmouth: England, 
1995) 39. [McCoubrey and White] 
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2 Use of Force by Regional Organisations 
Under the uni ersal peace and securit framework, regional organisations can only use 
force, hen the Security Council delegates its enforcement powers under Chapter YI I of the U 
Charter to regional organisations. pursuant to Chapter VIII of the UN Chatter. The delegation 
of powers b the Security Council may require the regional organisation to act against its own 
members or a non-member. 133 Regional organisation that may be used under Chapter VIII must 
have mandates to deal with international peace and security matters on a regional level. 134 This 
is especially important if a Security Council delegation to use enforcement action is outside the 
ambit of the constituent instrument of a regional organisation. 135 Sarooshi however reasonabl y 
suggests that in such situations the Security Council could delegate Chapter VJI powers 
express! to States with provision to use mechanisms of regional organisations, in order to 
allow States to choose how to implement the Security Council direction. 136 Regional 
organisations are also required to have a mandate for the pacific settlement of disputes which 
should always be utilised at the initial stages of a conflict. 137 
In order for a delegation to be lawful there must be three conditions. First, there must be 
specification of a clear objective. 138 Secondly, the Security Council will supervise the regional 
organisation s action under the delegation . Thirdly, the regional organisation must "at all times'· 
fully inform the Security Council of peace and security "activities undertaken or in 
contemplation". 139 
One issue that has clearly occupied regional organisations has been obtaining 
authorisation of the Security Council for any enforcement action. On a strict reading of the UN 
Charter. authorisation seems to be a prerequisite for regional use of force. However, the 
ECOWAS interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. and ATO' s intervention in Kosovo, 
133 Danesh Sarooshi The United at ions and the De1•elop111ent of Collective Security: The Delegation by the Un 
Security Council of ils Chapter VII Powers (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999) 251. [Sarooshi] 134 Charter, above n I 08, art 52( l ). 
135 Sarooshi , above n 133, 252-253. 
136 Sarooshi, abo\'e n 133,283 . 
137 U Charter, above n 108, arts 52(2) and 52(3). 
ns UN Charter, above n !08 , art 53. 
119 U Charter, above n 108, art 54. 
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illustrate that authorisation can be obtained retroactively. In the Liberian conflict ECOWAS 
resorted to enforcement action without the Security Council's authorisation. The Security 
Council howe er commended ECOWAS through a Presidential Statement after a ceasefire was 
negotiated. 140 ln the Sierra Leone conflict ECOWAS sent troops without the Security Council's 
authorisation, nor objection. The conflict however deteriorated and ECOWAS became fully 
engaged in it. It was not until 1999 that the Security Council approved ECO WAS· use of force 
in Sierra Leone. 141 In the Kosovo crisis NA TO bombing divided and paralysed the Security 
Council. although it did consider a draft resolution that condemned and called for immediate 
cessation of NATO action, which was o erwhelmingly defeated. 142 The Security Council did 
eventually issue a resolution after NA TO action was successful, but managed only to welcome 
the ceasefire. and authorised Member States and relevant international organisations to establish 
. . K 143 a secunt presence 111 oso o. 
In summary, the universal security framework prohibits the use of force, unless for 
individual or collective self-defence. or under Security Council authorisation. Such 
authorisation may also be given in the case of non-international armed conflict if the Security 
Council deems it a threat to international peace and security. For regional organisations, prior 
Security Council authorisation is required before it implements any enforcement action against 
a State. The regional organisation however may use enforcement action if it is invited to do so 
by the government of the State concerned, in , hich case authorisation may be obtained ex post 
facto from the Security Council. Retroactive authorisation may also be provided for 
enforcement action depending on how the Security Council views the circumstances of the 
crisis. howe er. as we ha e seen abo e with humanitarian intervention, this is an avenue that is 
too ,,vide and ma_ be open for abuse. and more importantly seriously risks the harmony in 
international relations. Inter ention howe er based on the responsibility to protect may likely to 
be less problematic legal! and politically. 
14° Franck. above n 111. I -6. The peace plan however failed and ECOWAS then went to the Security Council to 
seek authorisation for use of force, and also assistance. This, as provided by the Security Council and by 1996 the 
civil war ended. 
141 UNSC Resolution 1270 (22 October 1999) SIRES/ 1270, para 7. 
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C Non-international Armed Conflicts 
Since armed conflict in the Pacific will be non-international nature, another legal issue 
for the Forum is responding to breaches of the law of armed conflict, or what is now known as 
international humanitarian la\\ (IHL). IHL establishes legal thresholds as to when international 
humanitarian law is applicable, and thus, external response justifiable. 
1 The Parameters of International Humanitarian Law 
International humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed conflicts consists. 
first, of article 3 common of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions (common article 3), which 
protects those taking no active part in the conflict or made hors de combat, from inhumane 
treatment. discrimination, or murder. 144 It applies to each party of the non-international armed 
conflict. It is drafled in very broad language, and is considered a 'Convention in miniature' or a 
'microcosm' of the four Geneva Conventions applied to non-international armed conflict. 145 
Common aiticle 3 thus provides for "elementary considerations of humanity", applicable in all 
armed conflicts. 146 
The protection of States' so ereignty howe er limited common article 3's application. 
States were reluctant to apply common aiticle 3 to domestic affairs because of its wide ambit. 147 
Moreo er, insurgents are not given ·'prisoner of war" status, and are not protected from being 
prosecuted for taking up arms. Common aiticle 3 does not provide for a "grave breaches" 
regime which makes it mandatory for State pa1ties to enact domestic legislation to prosecute or 
extradite any person \\ ho breaches core criminal provisions, although it was provided for 
144 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Force in the 
Field ( 12 August 1949) 75 U TS J 1. art J [Geneva Convention I] ; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded. Sick and Shipwrecked Members of rmed Forces at Sea ( 12 August 1949) 75 UNTS 
85, art 3 [Geneva Convention II] ; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War ( 12 August 
1949) 75 TS 135, art 3 [Geneva Convention III] ; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War (12 August 1949) 75 U TS 287. art 3 [Geneva Convention IV]. The four conventions 
came into effect on 21 October 1950. 
145 Lindsa} Moir The law of Internal Armed C011flict (Cambridge niversity Press. London. 2002) 31. [Moir] 146 Military and Parami/ita,y Activities in and against icaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) 
[ 1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 2 18. 
147 Moir, above n 145. 34. 
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international armed conflict. 14 The culminating consequence of these features was that 
common article 3, as not fully obser ed in mo t non-international armed conflict that occurred 
after it came into force in 1950. The trend , as characterised as ''an almost universal 
phenomenon" because it was ' 'not yet generally accepted and applied''. 149 
Secondly, in response to the shortfalls of common article 3, Additional Protocol II was 
adopted in 1977 to de elop and supplement common article 3, but avoid ' 'modifying its exiting 
conditions of application".150 Additional Protocol II covers new ground compared to common 
article 3. It provides in detail obligations during non-international armed conflict for humane 
treatment of prisoners and non-combatants 151, including the wounded, sick and shipwrecked 152 . 
It also provides for extra protection of the civilian population by prohibiting the destruction of 
"objects indispensable for survival", ''works and installation containing dangerous forces", 
·'cultural objects and places of worship", and prohibits "forced movement of civilians". 153 
Additional Protocol II however outlines situations which are excluded from its 
application. 154 Additional Protocol II does not apply to "internal disturbances and tensions", 
and "isolated and sporadic acts of violence''. Moreover, its sets a high threshold before it is 
applied to non-international armed conflicts. 15- Furthermore, Additional Protocol II is intended 
to be independent, and not substitute, the threshold of common a1ticle 3. 156 In other words, 
common article 3 basically applies to all non-international armed conflict, while Additional 
Protocol II is applicable once its high threshold is satisfied. 
1
~
8 Gene a Convention l. above n 1-14, arts 49 and 50; Geneva Con ention II, above n 144, arts 50-1; Geneva 
Convention Ill, above n 144, arts 129-30; Geneva Convention I , above n 144, a,1s 146-7. For example, ew 
Zealand legislated for "gra, e breaches" in the Geneva Convention Act 1958. 
149 Moir, above n 145. 67. 
150 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
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151 Additional Protocol II, above n 150, art 4. Added prohibition of collective punishments, terrorism, slavery, 
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The effect of the high threshold is that it proved impossible for the prov1s1ons of 
Additional Protocol II to be applied to most conflicts. 157 Additional Protocol II also disregards 
the scenario that non-international armed conflict may occur between two non-governmental 
groups. This is most like!) to be a drafting overlap, however it was a significant as conflicts 
between organised groups, ithin the borders of a state was regular, like in the Solomo·n Islands 
crisis. Like common article 3, Additional Protocol II does not have a ''grave breaches" regime 
for non-international armed conflict. 158 
Thirdly, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted in I 998, finally 
criminalised the breach of international humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed 
conflicts. 159 despite significant opposition at the Rome Conference 160. Article 8 of the Rome 
Statute criminalises as war crimes the violations of common article 3, Additional Protocol II 
and customary international humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed conf1ict. 161 
This has paid some di idends for the international community. The Security Council has 
referred the conflict in the Darfur region of the Sudan to the International Criminal Court 
(ICC). 162 Moreover, the ICC has issued warrants against Ugandan rebels and government 
soldiers for numerous atrocities committed in orthern Uganda. 163 
A1ticle 8 is only concerned with the ar crimes committed as ·'part of a plan or policy", 
or "part of a large-scale commission''. 164 Moreover, only the "serious violations" of the war 
crimes committed during non-international armed conflict will be dealt with. This high bar will 
mean that those charged, ith, ar crimes are likely to be the politically and militarily powerful, 
157 Moir. above n 145, 1 ~O. These were the non-international armed conflicts in Angola, amibia, Mozambique, 
Somalia, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka. Haiti and icaragua. 
158 Bruno Simma and Andreas L. Paulus 'The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal 
Conflicts: A Positi ist ie\\" [ 1999] 93 AJIL 302, 310. In The Prosecutor v Tadic (Decision on the Defence 
Motion for Interlocutof) Appeal on Jurisdiction)(2 October 1995) IT-94- J-AR72 (Appeal Chamber, ICTY) para 
84, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held customary international Jaw had not yet established that breach of common 
article 3 amount to .. grave breaches". 
159 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court ( 17 July 1998) (Reproduced in the Schedule to the 
International Crimes and International Criminal Court Act 2000 (NZ)) arts I 2-14, 17. [Rome Statute] 160 Mahnoush Arsanjani "The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court" [ 1999] 93 AJ IL 22. 32. 161 Rome Statute, abo en 159. arts 8(2)(c) and 8(2)(e). 
162 U SC Resolution 1593 (31 March 2005) /RE 1593 (2005) para I. 163 Human Rights Watch " ICC Takes Decisive Step for Justice in Uganda" ( 14 October 2005) 
<http://www.hrw.org> {last accessed 31 October 2005). 
164 Rome Statute. above n 159, art 8( I). 
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and the core leaders behind the commission of war crimes. Article 8 however does not apply to 
"situations of internal disturbances and tensions" and "isolated and sporadic acts of violence", 
or other acts of a similar nature. 165 Moreover, it does not apply to situations where States use 
force to ·'maintain or re-establish law and order"'. or, to "defend the unity and territorial 
integrit of the State ... 166 Again. the principle of States' sovereignty was influential in 
reaffirming the parameters or external supervision and responses. 
Fourthly, customary international humanitarian law provides a significant body of legal 
principles applicable to non-international armed conflict. The International Committee for the 
Red Cross (ICRC) has recently conducted an authoritative study that has identified a list of 
customary international humanitarian Jaw applicable to both international and non-international 
armed conflict. 167 According to the ICRC stud}. customary international humanitarian law 
applicable to non-international armed conflict includes Additional Protocol II, plus the 
"widespread, representative and virtual! uniform" States' practice, opiniojuris, and treaty law 
not yet universally ratified but 'sufficient! supported by affected States". 168 
In summary, international humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed 
conflict has established parameters for external involvement. External involvement in domestic 
affairs is not permitted by IHL when the excluded situations exist. It should be understood that 
within these excluded situations. both national and international human rights law are applies to 
stop State highhandedness, however it "' ould take very serious violations of human rights law 
to warrant external responses. IHL and human rights law therefore provide a window for 
regional responses during non-international armed connict. The Forum would therefore have to 
165 Rome Statute, above n 159. art 8(2)(d) and 8(2)(e). 
166 Rome Statute. above n 159. art 8(3). 
167 Jean- larie Henckaerts " tud) on customary international humanitarian law: A contribution lo the 
understanding and respect for the rule of law in armed conflict" [2005] 87(857) International Review of the Red 
Cross 175, 189. [l Ienckae1ts] 
168 I Ienckaerts, abo,e n 167, 181-183. According to the ICRC study, customary JHL comprises of rules concerning: 
the distinction between ci, ilian objects and militar) objectives, prohibition of indiscriminate attad.s; 
proportionality of attack: precautions in attack; precautions against the effects of attack; protection of humanitarian 
relief personnel and objects; protection of ci"ilianjournalists; prohibition of attack. of protected zones; the denial of 
quarter; access to humanitarian relief; deception; re peel of cultural property; use of poison or poisoned weapons: 
use of biological weapons: use of chemical \\eapons; use of expanding bullets; use of exploding bullets; use of 
landmines; u e of incendiary \\eapons; and use of blinding la er weapons. 
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make accurate determinations as to when IHL and human rights laws are violated at a serious 
level to provoke a regional response. 
D Regional Organisations' Practice 
Regional organisations were established mainly for two reasons. First, the Cold War 
inclined states to form regional institutions mainly for defence purposes. 169 Secondly, 
decolonisation produced independent states that were committed to complete independence. 170 
We ha e seen above the practice of ECOWAS and NATO, however, due to the restraints of 
space, the following brief analysis v. ill be limited to the constitutions and practice of the 
regional organisations which, according to Simma. " the literature unanimously confers the 
status of regional arrangements or agency .. under Chapter Vlll of the UN Charter. 171 
1 Organisation o.f American States 
Jn 1890 states of the American continent formed the Commercial Bureau of American 
Republics which later e olved into the Pan American Union. In 1948 the Union was succeeded 
by the Organisation of American States (OAS) consisting originally of 21 member states. 172 
Fourteen other States later joined. The OAS Charter has provisions for pacific settlement of 
disputes and collective security. 173 The OAS has been involved in assisting the U 111 
discussions of security incidents relating to Guatemala in 1954, the Dominican Republic 111 
1960-5 and Cuba in 1960-2. 174 
The OAS is unfortunately an example of when larger States using regional organisations 
to benefit its own national foreign policies. In 1965 the United States (US) sent troops to the 
169 Bruno Sim ma (ed) The Charter c!f the United at ions: A commentary (Oxford Universit) Press, Oxford. l 994) 
1168. [Simma] 
170 Shaw, above n 110, 1168. 
171 Simma, above n 169, 699. 
m Organisation of American States "The OAS and the Inter-American System" <http://www.oas.org> (last 
accessed on 8 April 2005). 
173 Charter of the Organisation of American States, eh V and VI <http://www.oas.org> (last accessed on 8 April 
2005). 
174 Simma, abo en 169, 700. 
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internal conflict in the Dominican Republic to protect US citizens; however the US troops 
resorted to force ,,hich effectively benefited one of the hostile parties. The OAS later sent an 
Inter-American-Force at the in itation of the hostile parties in order to administer a ceasefire 
agreement. The OAS force however was dominated by the US and to some it was seen as a 
continuation of the unlawful intervention by the US. 175 In 1989 the US again resorted to 
unilateral intervention. this time in Panama. justifying its actions under article 5 I of the UN 
Cha1ier and also article 21 of the OAS Charter. The intervention however was condemned 
internationally and also by the OAS. 
At the end of the Cold War however the climate changed mainly due to growth of 
democratically elected governments. 176 The OAS was involved in monitoring the Nicaraguan 
elections in Haiti in 1989 and in Haiti in 1990. and the conflict in El Salvador. In 1991 it 
adopted the Declaration of Santiago where the OAS Council is to be convened immediately if 
democratic process or power is interrupted. 177 On that basis it became involved in after the 
elected governments in Haiti. Peru and Guatemala were overthrown. The most serious decision 
was the threat of economic sanctions against Haiti. 
2 The League of Arab States 
The LAS came into existence m 1945. ln 1952 the Joint Defence and Economic 
Cooperation Treaty came into force, hich established a collective security and defence system 
for the LAS. The LAS has proposed reforms which includes adjustment of its collective 
security system and provisions of paci fie settlement of disputes, but these reforms have yet to 
come into force. 178 
The LAS provides an example of a regional organisation that resorted to force without 
authorisation of the Security Council. The LAS involvement in 1976 in the Lebanon civil war 
175 McCoubrey and White, above n 132,248. 
176 Antonio Handler Chayes and Abram Chayes Planning.for Intervention: International Cooperation in Con.flicl 
Management (Kluwer Law International , The Hague, 1999) 22. [Chayes and Chayes] 
177 OAS General Assembly Resolution I 080 (5 June 1991) XX 1-0/9 I <http://www.oas.org> (last accessed 28 
ovember 2005). 
178 Simma, above n 169, 701. 
44 
was a mixture of both peacekeeping duties and also enforcement action. This was mainly due to 
the dominance of S. ria in the LAS troops sent and its policy of supporting pro-Syrian factions 
fighting in the ci ii , ar. The LAS in olvement was ended in 1982 when the Lebanese 
government \ ithdrew their consent for the LAS presence in Lebanon; however Syria remained 
and became heavily in olved in the conflict. 
3 The 1-~fi·ican Union 
Jn 1963 32 African states formed the Organisation of African Unity with its own dispute 
settlement procedures. In 1999 the OAU became the African Union (AU) and one of its many 
objecti es is to promote peace, security and stability in Africa. 179 In July 2002 the AU adopted 
the Protocol for the Establishment of the AU Peace and Security Council, and came into force 
in December 2003. 180 On 16 March 2004 the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) held its 
first meeting, and on 25 May 2004 it was officially launched. The AUPSC is a permanent 
decision-making body for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. United 
Nations experts assisted the AU in drafting the PSC Protocol. 181 The objectives of the AUPSC 
is to: promote peace. security and stabilit in Africa; anticipate and prevent conflicts; promote 
and implement peace-building and post conflict reconstruction activities; coordinate and 
harmonise combating of terrorism; develop a common defence policy; and promote and 
d . . . l 1s2 encourage emocrat1c prmc1p es. 
Before the AUPSC was established, the AU was involved in most of the major conflicts 
in Africa since 1990. including Somalia and the Congo however intervention has mainly been 
through preventive diplomacy. 183 In Rwanda it tried to assemble an African peace keeping force 
howe er it failed due to lack of support from the western powers. 184 After the establishment the 
AUPSC. the AU became much more invol ed in the security situations around Africa, 
including Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
179 The Constituti e Act of the African Union , a11 3(1) <http://www.africa-union.org> (last accessed 8 April 2005). 180 African Union Protocol for the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, art 2, <http://www.africa-
union.org> (last accessed 8 April 2005) r AUPSC Protocol]. 
181 Cooperation Report, abo e n I 04, para 5. 
18' - AUPSC Protocol , above n 180, art 3. 
183 Chayes and Chayes, above n 176, 20. 
184 Chayes and Chayes, above n 176, 21 . 
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Ethiopia and Eritrea, Ivo1; Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone. and the Sudan. 185 The crisis in the 
Darfur region of the Sudan where the Arab Janjaweed militia have basically attacked the ethnic 
African civilian population, has occupied most of the time of the AUPSC. Despite a ceasefire 
that \\as successfully negotiated cea efire and peace agreements, the situation continued to 
deteriorate. It was not until late October 2004 that a peacekeeping force, consisting of troops 
and police officers, were sent in to reinforce the African Union Mission to the Sudan (AMIS). 
AMIS continues to pro ide peacekeeping duties. and the AU has managed to take parties to 
their se enth round of peace talks. 
In summar., it seems that in the post-Cold War era with an enlivened Security Council, 
regional organisations are proactive in dealing with peace and security matters within their 
respective regions. This is quite clear in the turbulent regions of Africa and South America. 
This confirms the realisation that regional peace and security could be more effectively dealt 
with on a regional level, and also to avoid decisions on regional matters being determined by 
the national interests of the five permanent members of the Security Council. 
What then could a formalised peace and security framework look like for the Forum? 
IV FOKMALISING THE FORUM'S PEACE AND SECURITY FRAMEWORK 
A Legal Mandate 
In order for the Forum to addre regional peace and security the obvious first step is to 
give it a legal mandate to do so. As mentioned abo e. its present mandate is based on political 
expressions, and utilisation of the Forum's peace and security mechanism depends largely on 
Australian and ew Zealand political will. With a formalised mandate, the Forum could 
therefore ha e a leading role in order to impose positive obligations on tales not only to 
respond, but to respond early and effectively. A Forum driven response could also ensure a 
185 AU Peace and Security Council Communique ( 13 April 2004) PSC/ PR/Comm. (V); AU Peace and Security 
Council Communique (25 1ay 200-l) P C Al IG,Comm. (I ) <http: www.africa.union.org (last acce sed 18 
November 2005). 
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truly regional response. and avoid international political Oak for larger States who are likely to 
'foot the bill'. 
nder the U Charter, the Forum could be moulded as a Chapter VIII regional 
organisation, with a mandate to deal '" ith regional peace and security, rather than a defence-
pact. The Forum is already in existence v. ith a growing membership from all over the Paci fie 
region. Its original and present mandate was not intended as a defence pact. Since Aitutaki and 
Biketawa were adopted, the Forum nov has a core objective to establish regional cooperation 
on security, as broadly defined. Moreo er. the limited military capacity of Forum States, and 
the non-existence of threats within and from outside the region renders a defence pact 
unrealistic. 
The new Forum agreement, if it doesn't have such a provision, could therefore expressly 
provide for the Forum the legal mandate to be responsible for situations that amount to a threat 
or breach of peace and security in the region. The Agreement could also provide that the peace 
and security resolutions of the Forum are legally binding on all Forum States. 
B Peace and Security Purposes 
The Forum could. at the least, have the following purposes or objectives. First, promote 
peace and security throughout the region. At the moment it is mostly the civil societies and 
international organisations that are in the forefront of pushing for peace and security in the 
region. The Forum could be more active however at the grassroots as it has the wider network 
in the region . It could capacitate and support institutions that could provide a long lasting 
solution. 
Secondly, monitor and address in a timely manner potential threats that may lead to 
future peace and security crises. The Bougainville conflict was sown when Bougainville pleas 
for separation from PNG before independence went unheeded. The Solomon Islands conflict 
had also been brewing for generations since colonisation, and coups in Fiji are a direct result of 
the deeply embedded ethnic issues. The Forum must address these underlying causes of conflict 
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more emphatically. Gi ing it a legal mandate to do so should hopefully drive more impetus. A 
reinforced Political. lnternational and Legal Affairs Division in the Forum Secretariat with 
more personnel , ho are expe11s, at the least, in peace and security matters, such as conflict 
prevention, conflict resolution, defence strategies and crisis management. 
Thirdly, facilitate and use preventi e diplomacy to vigorously pursue peace where crises 
have occurred. The Forum States are rich with distinguished political, religious, cultural and 
academic personnel who could be engaged as monitors, negotiators, mediators or eminent 
person groups. Resolutions of the Forum on peace and security crises would not only be legally 
binding on States, but is likely to ha e significant clout on individual citizens who may be 
invol ed in the conflict. A regional oice could put considerable pressure on, for example, 
insurgents. This was e ident in the immediate surrender of the militia in Solomon Islands when 
RAMS! arrived. 
Fourthly, the Forum could coordinate, direct or delegate any regional response to a 
crisis especially regional response involving police and military forces. Lastly, the Forum could 
facilitate and monitor peace building efforts, in particular addressing the core causes of the 
conflict to ensure a non-repeat of the conflict. The Forum has already indicated a readiness to 
utilise customary practices of reconciliation that is a significant part of Pacific cultures. These 
practices are still utilised to this day, and have a profound way of at the very least putting down 
weapons, opening dialogue and hopefully heal deep historical wounds. 
C Peace and Security Principles 
The folio, ing could be the guiding principles for the Forum in dealing with peace and 
securit crisis. First, there could be a priority for regional unity and solidarity on addressing 
peace and security. International mechanisms can only work if there is political will. Once that 
foundation is secured, regional action should become automated. Forum members must 
recognise they have to act collectively because a threat to one is a threat to all, and that no one 
nation can deal on its own with the modern threats to peace and security. 
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Second!., and the most important, Forum States could embrace the emerging concept of 
the responsibility to protect. not only its own citizens, but also the citizens of fellow Forum 
States who are unable or um, illing to do so. Although the protection of States sovereignty was 
a core basis of the formation of the Forum, and continues to influence Forum activity, the 
growing interdependence of States has worn the defences of this traditional boundary 
considerably. One argument against the application of the concept in the Forum States is that, 
for small Forum States. in some aspects, it could be beyond their resources. However, resources 
to protect citizens can be boosted with foreign aid from States, international organisations and 
civil societies. Another opposing argument is that the concept could directly contradict 
embedded culture. Culture however. is a living practice, and its practitioners can change it if it 
would be more advantageous. 
It would therefore be in the interests of the Forum States to embrace and accept this re-
conceptualisation of States sovereignty. First, and foremost, it could ensure the core principles 
outlined by Aitutaki and Biketawa will be observed and protected by national governments. 
They include good governance, fundamental human rights and freedoms, democratic process 
and institutions. the rule of law, sustainable development and indigenous rights. Secondly. the 
principle is now a customary international law principle. We have seen examples of the 
atrocities the principle seeks to avoid in the displacement of more than 35,000 people from their 
homes during the Solomon Islands conflict. Could it happen again? It may soon. or, it may in 
the next generation. These ethnic disputes are deeply rooted and have to be addressed 
effecti ely early. The ethnic tension in Fiji also has potential to escalate to atrocities, again. if 
not addressed effectively early. The situation in Bougainville is also still fizzling with the 
disco ery that militants are being trained. In order to respond effectively. the Forum Members 
must therefore accept that regional response is justified if they are unable, or unwilling to 
protect their citizens from atrocities. 
Thirdly, Forum Leaders have alwa)S believed that there are more constructive steps 
achieved from talking rather than fighting. Resorting to use of force should always be a last 
option. Moreover, it takes time for connicts to break-out and so diplomatic means should be 
fully utilised for conflict prevention. Once conflict breaks out the damage is nearly always 
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irreversible. and it , ould be especial! felt in the small Forum States. It would also be 
particularly relevant for the Pacific as most States have basically a limited technical Jaw 
enforcement and military capability to suppress insurgency. Peaceful settlement of disputes or 
crisis is therefore of utmost importance. 
Fourthly, after every crisis there is a healing process and the concept of the Pacific Way 
is ideal to provide the healing process. Nearly all the Pacific cultures have their own way of 
dealing with forgiveness, reconciliation and rebuilding. These traditional means should be 
utilised as most threats to peace and security can be dealt with effectively at the grassroots 
level. whether it be political, social, economic, environmental or political. However. as we have 
seen in Fiji, nation building should also include the administration of justice. where those who 
have iolated national and international law are not allowed to escape with impunity. Denying 
justice would only amount to rekindling the emotions that founded conflict. 
D Forum Powers 
Depending on the circumstances of the situation a regional response could then be 
authorised b the Forum. The authorised action could include pacific settlement of disputes 
through preventive diplomacy. which includes the actions under Biketawa. These include a 
press release representing the view of Forum States on the situation; creating a Ministerial 
Action Group; deploying a fact finding mission; convening and deploying an eminent persons 
group; third party mediation: and support institutions or mechanisms. A peace and security 
mandated Forum could thus be seized of the de elopments in Tonga, Papua New Guinea and 
Vanuatu, and at the lease adopt a resolution encouraging national institutions to pacify matters. 
If a situation however warrants the deployment of peacekeeping personnel this has to be 
implemented at the invitation of the Forum State concerned, and in the absence of a formal 
government, the agreement of the hostile parties. Since crises in the Pacific would mainly be 
widespread lawlessness, it is vital that civilian police officers be a significant part of the 
peacekeeping forces. However, like RAMSI, a military force could also be deployed to play a 
supporting role, and for insurgents to know there is a military presence that could be used. On a 
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deterrent level. the availability of regional forces could make potential coup instigators, 
militants, revolutionaries and gangs real!) think about their intentions. rt would also provide 
assurance to the peoples of the region that regional assistance is readily available when 
required, e en if their own governments are unable or unwilling to protect them. For 
convenience and to speed-up deployment of peacekeeping forces, Forum States could consider 
signing a multilateral Status of Forces Agreement that would allow Forum authorised forces to 
be present within Forum States and carr out peacekeeping duties. 
The question then arises as to whom the Forum would suppo11 when a response force is 
deplo ed. From a legal perspective a Forum force would have to support the government as it is 
the government who wa the contracting party that is the source of its existence. From a moral 
perspective, the Forum howe er must protect the innocent and those suffering in the conflict. 
Kabutaulaka questions RAMSI's support of Kemakeza in Solomon Islands when Kemakeza 
himself had supported militants during the conflict, and only called for intervention when that 
relationship deteriorated. 186 These are difficult issues which will only depend on the 
circumstances of the crisis. The solution however could be Forum responses must be invited by 
the State, however, once there, a neutral stance on the conflict should be maintained with the 
primary aim of ending the violence and, to bring the hostile parties to sit around the mat and 
address the core problems now rather than later. A peace and security mandated Forum should 
therefore focus its efforts on conflict prevention and nation building. 
In the rare situation where a conflict escalates to a stage where the use of force is 
warranted, the Forum must respond decisive!). This would likely to happen when there is wide 
scale violation of IHL during non-international arn1ed conflict. Both the Bougainville and 
Solomon Islands conflicts could have benefited from an early regional response. Developments 
in Tonga, the PNG Highlands and Vanuatu could be closely monitored with strategies planned, 
rather than waiting for those States to come calling for assistance when conflict breaks out. Jf 
force is required and a Forum States' invitation is not given or not forthcoming, Security 
Council authorisation must be sought before intervention is carried out. Security Council 
authorisation mu t be unambiguous, and the Forum must recognise that the Security Council 
186 Kabutaulaka I, above n 27, 300. 
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maintains supervisory rights throughout any crises. The Forum must regularly report to the 
Security Council on the enforcement action taken or contemplated. Intervention should not be 
incremental. Intervention should be decisive and forceful, not in the military sense, but more in 
appearance. 
The ex1genc1es of the situation however, may require regional intervention initially 
without Security Council authorisation. In the context of Pacific crises, it is likely that most 
peace and security crises could initially involve widespread lawlessness. Such a scale could 
al read significantly threaten the sovereignty of the Forum State. We have seen in the Solomon 
Islands that there were acts that amounted to ethnic cleansing through the displacement of 
Malaitans from Guadalcanal. and al o crimes against humanity with the murder, rape and attack 
on innocent civilians. In Bougainville it was the same but on a prolonged scale. In Fiji, the 
Indo-Fijian population were targeted. and if Speight was allowed to govern, it was more than 
likely the Jndo-Fijians could have received worse treatment. Jt is therefore available for the 
Forum to resort to the use of force before obtaining Security Council authorisation, on the basis 
of the responsibility to protect. Security Council authorisation could then be obtained 
retroactive! at the first opportunity after the enforcement action is implemented. 
E Administration 
The exercise of the Forum's peace and security mandate could be assigned to the 
Forum's Forum Regional Security Committee, to sit as a formalised body, mostly at officials, 
or Ministerial level and. exercising their duties in accordance with mandates from their 
respective national go emments. Due to the emphasis on consensus, all full members of the 
Forum should be represented, and State should hold one vote each. Decisions should be made 
on consensus. howe er. if there are is no consensus then a vote is taken. A simple majority is 
required for procedural matters, and other matters require two-thirds majority. The FRSC's 
agenda could be left for the States, other than the concerned State, to agree on by consensus. A 
State therefore must persuade the other tates not to include an issue if it opposes regional 
response on the issue. It could therefore be the responsibility of the Secretary-General to 
identify agenda items from developments around the region. The chairmanship of the FR C 
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could rotate half early based on the alphabetical order of States. Meetings could be convened 
at least half yearly in order to remain abreast\\ ith developments. 
Secretariat support obviously could be provided by the Forum Secretariat; however the 
relevant Di ision ,, ith the Secretariat could consist of dedicated officers to closely monitor and 
analyse peace and security threats and developments. Technical advice from military, police 
and legal should be maintained. Civilian expert advice based on grassroots issues such as 
culture, religion , environment, gender and youth should also be available. 
F Forum's Response Forces 
In relation to establishing an enforcement arm for the Forum, the idea of a Pacific 
military or police force has been discussed in the Forum for years now. 187 The author however 
suggests that Forum States could commit themselves by declaring a minimum number of 
police, military, health and professional personnel they would put on stand-by for the Forum to 
call on in times of crisis. 
First. it is less costly as the logistics of maintaining such a force in one place for an 
indeterminate period. Secondly, it is more logical to keep scarce personnel in their home States 
where they are most needed, but they can remain on stand-by for regional duty. Thirdly, a 
mixture of both military and civilian membership in the force is more relevant to Pacific crises. 
RAMS I's use of police led intervention,, ith militar backup should be the precedence. Final I} , 
regional law enforcement organisations, such as the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police, and Forum 
militaries, regular!) train together. 188 A common training programme on responding to peace 
and security situations could therefore be provided to all the Forum States' personnel. In a time 
of crisis these stand-by personnel would only need to gather at an agreed launching point, be 
briefed on the situation. and get deployed as a collective force under one command. 
187 Fergus Hanson "Promoting a pacifi c Pacific: A Functional Proposal for Regional Security in the Pacific 
Islands"' [2003] 4 Melbourne Journal of International Law 254; Sean Kikkert" A South Pacific Police Force?" 
[2004] 8(2) Journal of South Pacific Law and Christopher Richter "Security Cooperation in the South Pacific: 
Building on Biketawa" [2004] 8(2) Journal of South Pacific Law <http://www.paclii.org> (last accessed 28 
ovember 2005) 
188 e, Zealand Police" Z helps to develop common policing standards for Pacific" ( 19 August 2005) TEN-ONE 
7. 
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V CONCLUSION 
This paper has presented a Pacific region with a precarious peace and security situation. 
Recent peace and security crises in Papua Ne"' Guinea, Fiji and the Solomon Islands illustrate 
the situation. These crises however have not been fully resolved. Bougainvilleans have been 
recently discovered to be still recei ing military training. Fiji is processing legislation that 
would pro ide oppoitunity to pro ide amnesty for the 2000 coup instigators, which will 
definitely tarnish already weakened ethnic relations. The success of RAMS! in the Solomon 
Islands is slowing down, but ethnic tension remains. Situations in Tonga, the Highlands 
Province in Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu are also potential crisis situations. 
It has also been suggested that a formalised peace and security framework for the Forum 
1s an available option for Forum States to strengthen regional response to crises based on 
existing factors. The Pacific Islands Forum's peace and security framework lacks binding legal 
status that would enforce positive obligations to respond to peace and security crisis in a time!) 
manner. Tt also does not provide for certain scenarios of conflicts, nor clarifies what targeted 
measures the Forum can invoke. Humanitarian atrocities were committed in the recent crise . 
such as the displacement, attacks and inhuman treatment of civilian populations. The regional 
political climate supports regionalism. The United Nations is prepared to call on regional 
organisations to share its responsibility to deal with international peace and security. In a 
formalised Forum. Forum States could embrace the responsibility to protect concept. and accept 
that the use of force should be a last resort. although it can be utilised on the basis of a 
responsibility to protect when there are massive violations of 11-JL and human rights laws. 
Tn conclusion. peace and security issues are unlikely to disappear because they are man 
made. Forum States must establish a peace and security mechanism that requires regional 
action. but also action that is timely, effective, legal and legitimate, on a constant and 
permanent basis. Establishing and appropriately equipping a Pacific Islands Forum with a 
formalised regional peace and security framework could make the vision of the Forum Leaders 
in 2004 to have a region of "'peace, harmony. security and economic prosperity, so that all its 
people can lead free and wo1thwhile lives" more realistic. 
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